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POISON PILLS AND LITIGATION
UNCERTAINTY
CHARLES M. YABLON*
Five or six years ago, as hostile takeovers became an increasingly
common and accepted part of American business practice, the general
belief was that incumbent management could take no action that would
effectively prevent a hostile takeover. Available defensive tactics were a
mixed blessing. "Shark-repellent" charter amendments,1 for example,
might increase a raider's costs and potentially delay the acquisition of
control, but such amendments also signaled management's perception of
its company as a target that a persistent raider could capture.2
Litigation against a hostile offeror was also primarily a delaying tac-
tic.3 An offeror could always deflect claims based on inadequate disclo-
sures by making additional disclosures. Only on rare occasions did
successful litigation of antitrust or certain other specialized claims actu-
ally lead a court to require that a raider abandon its bid. Such claims,
which could shut down an offer completely, were known as "show-
stoppers." 4
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1. Such amendments are intended to make target companies less attractive takeover candi-
dates and to protect minority shareholders in case tender offers succeed. The various kinds of shark
repellents are discussed in Friedenberg, Jaws II: The Impropriety of Shark-Repellent Amendments
as a Takeover Defense, 7 DEL. L.'CORP. L. 32, 35-48 (1982).
2. As a noted expert on tender offer defenses wrote at the time: "[t]he efficacy of these provi-
sions has been subject to debate, and considerable skepticism expressed. The skepticism is warranted
if a company adopts a shark repellent and believes itself then immune from a takeover." I A.
FLEISCHER, TENDER OFFERS: DEFENSES, RESPONSES AND PLANNING 11 (1983) (footnote omit-
ted); see also E. ARANOw & H. EINHoRN, TENDER OFFERS FOR CORPORATE CONTROL 259 (1973)
(describing restrictions on voting as "classic examples of overreaction to the tender offer phenome-
non"); Fogg, Foye & Sunberg, Developments and Trends in Non-Negotiated Acquisitions and Take.
overs, in AcQuismoNs AND MERGERS: TACTICS AND TECHNIQUES 93, 144 (Practising Law Inst.
1983) ("While a supermajority provision may give shareholders protection in a partial tender offer, it
has little effect on an acquiror who seeks control through a stock accumulation program to be fol-
lowed by a proxy contest or through... any and all tender offers.").
3. See Merrifield, Defensive Tacticrs in CASH TENDER OFFERS 155, 165 (Practising Law InsL
1974).
4. If the target's primary objective is to remain independent, litigation may provide the
avenue to success. But success usually requires a "show-stopper," i.e., a substantive viola-
tion by the bidder which results in an injunction against the offer and which cannot be
readily cured. For example, the target may claim that the bidder is violating the margin
rules or regulatory change-of-control requirements which are applicable to the target (sic].
POISON PILLS
The appearance, in 1983 and 1984,5 of the ominously named
"poison pill" shook this view of the dynamics of takeover contests. For
the first time, there" arose a corporate show-stopper-a device that in-
cumbent management could adopt by itself and that would have effects
on a hostile raider so drastic and expensive that no offer could be con-
summated without target management's approval. When litigants first
tested the legality of the pill before the Delaware Supreme Court in Mo-
ran v. Household International Inc, 6 those opposing the poison pills,
including the SEC, argued that the pill, if declared legal, would "virtu-
ally eliminate hostile tender offers."7 Other experts in the field predicted
that no one would ever make a hostile offer in the face of a poison pill
defense."
It hasn't quite worked out that way. The Delaware Supreme Court
in Moran did hold that management's adoption of the pill in that case
was legally permissible,9 and poison pills have since become part of many
companies' takeover defenses. 10 Yet, raiders continue to successfully
make hostile tender offers for control of such companies. Most of these
raiders have succeeded not by obtaining legal invalidation of pills
(although that has occurred in some cases)" and not by following offer-
ing strategies that avoid triggering the dilutive effects of pills (such strate-
gies have worked in the past, but more sophisticated pill drafting has
In some cases, litigation has been used as part of an overall "scorched earth" strategy of
some targets to stymie and demoralize a bidder.
1 A. FIEIscHiR, supra note 2, at 299-300;, see also E. ARANow & H. EiNHORN, supra note 2, at 266
("Where appropriate, legal action may be the surest method of bringing the offer to a grinding halt
and... may often be enough to assure the ultimate defeat of the offer.").
5. The poison pfill's forerunners, dividends of preferred stock with very favorable conversion
features, emerged in 1983. Marty Lipton has said that he conceived of the poison pill in December,
1982. OFFICE OF THE CHIEF ECONOMIST, SEC, THE EFFECrS OF POISON PILIS ON THE WEALTH
oF TARGET SHAREHOLDERS I n.1 (1986). Companies adopted the first pills with "flip-over" provi-
sions in 1984. See CORPORATE ANnr-TAxEovER DEFENSES: THE POISON PILL DEVICE xviii, In-
tro.-I (P. Richter ed. 1988) (introduction by H. Bloomenthal) [hereinafter CORPORATE ANTI-
TAKEOVER DEFENSES].
6. 500 A.2d 1346 (Del 1985).
7. A. FLEISCHER, G. HAZARD & M. KLIPPER, BOARD GAMEs: THE CHANGING SHAPE OF
CORPORATE POWER 84 (1988) (quoting SEC's amicus brief in Moran).
8. Id (describing testimony of Richard C. Abbott, former head of mergers and acquisitions at
Morgan Stanley & Co., and Alan Greenberg, Chief Executive Officer of Bear Stearns & Co.).
9. Moran, 500 A.2d at 1357.
10. In the aftermath of Moran, over 300 companies adopted poison pill plans. Helman &
Junewicz, A Fresh Look at Poison Pills, 42 Bus. LAW. 771, 771 (1987). By mid-1988, over 500
corporations had adopted them. A. FLEISCHER, G. HAZARD & M. KLIPPER, supra note 7, at 86.
11. See eg., Bank of N.Y. Co. v. Irving Bank Corp., 139 Misc. 2d 665, 670-71, 528 N.Y.S.2d
482, 485-86 (Sup. Ct.) (target enjoined from enforcing rights plan that limited authority of any board
other than present board to redeem), aff'd, 143 A.D.2d 1074, 533 N.Y.S.2d 167 (1988).
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limited their success). 1 2 Rather, these raiders have succeeded because
incumbent managers have eventually proved willing to redeem pills as
part of negotiated resolutions of takeover contests.13
The question, of course, is why such settlements occur. If the pill is
indeed such an effective deterrent, then why don't incumbent managers,
secure in the knowledge that no raider in its right mind would attempt a
takeover in the face of such a defense (no offeror has ever taken an action
that has triggered a pill's dilutive provisions), simply hunker down, de-
clare offers "inadequate," and tell raiders to get lost? Conversely, if, as
some of the most recent cases indicate,14 the poison pill serves primarily
as a delaying tactic and may not be used to indefinitely prevent share-
holders from obtaining and evaluating tender offers, then why are offer-
ors willing to raise their offer prices substantially in exchange for
management redemption of pills?
The answer to these questions requires an appreciation of the legal
uncertainty that surrounds the use of poison pills. Almost every raider,
as one of its first acts after announcing a tender offer, brings suit against
the target and its board of directors, seeking either invalidation of the pill
or an order requiring the board to redeem it.15 Thus, at the time when
incumbent management makes its decisions regarding redemption and
settlement, it is also actively defending a lawsuit. This litigation involves
substantial legal uncertainty. Many states have now made a threshold
12. The most successful example of such a strategy was pursued by Sir James Goldsmith's
takeover of Crown Zellerbach. By acquiring over 50% of Crown Zellerbach's shares, but not pro-
posing any second-step transaction, Goldsmith avoided triggering the flip-over provisions of the
company's pill. Tharp, Goldsmith Wins Fight for Crown Zellerbach Corp., Wall St. J., July 26, 1985,
at 3, col. 1, 12, col. 1. Such a strategy would not have worked, however, if the Crown Zellerbach pill
had had a flip-in as well as a flip-over provision. See infra text accompanying notes 26-27.
13. See Comment & Jarrell, Two-Tier and Negotiated Tender Offers: The Imprisonment of the
Free Riding Shareholder, 19 J. FIN. ECON. 283, 296-97 (1987). As Comment and Jarrell's study of
cash tender offers between 1981 and 1984 indicates, 45% of the offers that began as non-negotiated
(i.e. not involving a written agreement approved by management) had been negotiated (i.e. settled)
by the offer's consummation date. Another 31% were successfully consummated without settle-
ment, and 24% were not consummated. Id Although the study does not say so, at least some of the
offers that were not consummated probably also involved settlements, that is, agreements by the
raider to withdraw in exchange for greenmail, standstill agreements, seats on the board, or other
consideration.
Unfortunately, the time period covered by the study overlaps with the early introduction of the
poison pill; as a result, the study does not fully indicate the poison pills' effect, which was probably to
increase the occurrence both of negotiated takeovers and of defeated takeovers (which may also
involve negotiated settlements). Recent takeovers that have occurred after negotiated settlements,
without any judicial invalidation of a target's pill, have occurred in such hotly contested matters as
Campeau's takeover of Federated Department Stores, BNS's takeover of Koppers Co., and Philip
Morris' acquisition of Kraft.
14. See infra notes 54, 80-87, and accompanying text.
15. In virtually every case, moreover, the raider conditions consummation of its offer on such
judicial invalidation or board redemption. See infra note 46.
POISON PILLS
determination whether their corporate laws permit the adoption of
poison pills.16 However, a raider or target director who wants to know
whether and under what circumstances target management can permit
the triggering of a validly adopted poison pill, and when management has
an affirmative fiduciary obligation to redeem the pill, will find that the
answers remain uncertain.17
This uncertainty about the circumstainces in which management can
actually use poison pills accounts, I believe, for much of the pressure that
drives raiders and incumbent management to the bargaining table. If
this is true, then litigation uncertainty is an important and functional
aspect of the law regulating poison pills. Yet most analyses either ignore
litigation uncertainty or, if they notice it at all, assume that such uncer-
tainty itself poses a "problem." Some seek to "solve" this problem by
trying to discern clear operational rules behind the unclear and some-
times conflicting language ofjudicial opinions.' Others seek to eliminate
it by prescribing in clear and certain terms what they believe are the most
appropriate rules for courts to follow in the future. 19 In either case, liti-
gation uncertainty is viewed as both temporary and troubling, a gap in
the law that must be filled. 2
This Article takes a contrary perspective. It considers the uncer-
tainty surrounding the permissible use of poison pills as a significant part
of the legal climate in which takeover contests occur. The Article ana-
lyzes the causes of this uncertainty and its effects on the participants in a
takeover contest. Part I shows that under a regime of legal uncertainty,
both raiders and incumbent boards face constraints and incentives sub-
stantially different from those presented by a law that clearly prohibits or
clearly permits the use of poison pills. Part II then argues that the cur-
16. See infra notes 57-58.
17. Indeed, the Moran court, in approving Household's adoption of a poison pill plan, stated
that it was expressing no opinion about whether management could actually allow the pill's dilutive
effects to be triggered. Moran, 500 A.2d at 1357; see infro notes 61-65 and accompanying text.
18. Practicing lawyers tend to follow this approach. See eg., CoRpORATE ANTI-TAKEOVER
DEFENSES, supra note 5, at Intro.-52 to -54 (offering "guides to corporate counsel"); Helman &
Junewicz, supra note 10, at 774-88 (drawing specific "procedural and substantive standards" from
recent decisions). As an indication of the degree of uncertainty that marks this area, some have
described the effort to eliminate the uncertainty as impossible. Dawson, Pence & Stone, Poison Rill
Defensive Measure, 42 Bus. LAW. 423, 438 (1987) (The implications and ramifications of the
litigation involving poison pills are uncertain. Nor can it be predicted with any degree of certainty
which direction the courts will take in the inevitable future litigation.").
19. Academic lawyers tend to favor this approach. See, ag., Gilson & Kraakman, Delaware!s
Intermediate Standard for Defensive Tactics: Is There Substance to Proportionality Review?, 44 Bus.
LAw. 247, 270-72 (1989).
20. For example, Gilson and Kraakman argue that unless the Delaware courts articulate a new
standard, the uncertainty regarding poison pills will collapse into "yet another rhetorical embellish-
ment of the business judgment rule." Id at 260.
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rent level of litigation uncertainty is not a temporary aberration, but
rather the most likely outcome of judges' and corporate lawyers' rational
behavior. Litigation uncertainty is therefore likely to diminish slowly, if
at all. Finally, part III considers the normative question of what the
legal rules governing poison pills should be. It concludes that, under
certain fairly plausible assumptions, the case for continuing legal uncer-
tainty may be stronger than the case for a rule that clearly permits the
use of poison pills or a law that clearly prohibits such use.
I. THE EFFECTS OF LEGAL UNCERTAINTY IN POISON
PILL LITIGATION
A. Poison 1&- The State of the Art
The term "poison pill" has no precise definition. It generically de-
notes a range of defensive techniques, 21 usually adopted by boards of di-
rectors as amendments to company bylaws. Such amendments generally
authorize creation of a new class of securities, and "Rights" to purchase
those securities. The board then makes these Rights available to stock-
holders by declaring a dividend of one Right per outstanding common
share.22 At the time when the board declares the "dividend," the Rights
have neither economic significance nor, for that matter, any physical
existence.23
21. The Chief Economist's report refers to poison pills as a "family of shareholder rights agree-
ments." OFFICE OF THE CHIEF ECONOMIST, SEC, supra note 5, at 1. In this Article, I do not
propose to discuss all of the various kinds of devices that have at one time or another been labeled
"poison pills." See infra note 24 for a brief mention of some of these devices. Rather, for expository
purposes, I consider a "typical" pill, one that combines both flip-over and flip-in provisions and gives
a board wide-ranging power to redeem the pill or suspend its operation.
22. The powers and provisions relating to the Rights are usually set forth in considerable detail
in a Rights Agreement, which is generally publicly disclosed through filings with the SEC.
23. The present "right" conferred by a Right usually has no economic value. For instance, the
Right may permit its holder to purchase a "unit" (one one-hundredth of a share) of a new issue of
preferred stock, whose dividend is so low that no one would purchase it at the exercise price. How.
ever, just in case some Rights holder were, for some bizarre reason, to decide to exercise the Right,
the agreement governing the Rights generally provides that such Rights cannot be exercised until the
so-called "Distribution Date." Finally, as a further demonstration of their insubstantiality, the
Rights have no physical existence when declared. Rather, they are usually "attached implicitly" to
the target's outstanding common stock certificates; they trade along with that stock. Rights holders
do not receive certificates evidencing the Rights until the "Distribution Date," which is triggered by
events that portend a change in control, such as an announcement that a person has obtained benefi-
cial ownership of twenty percent or more of the target's common stock, or any person's announce-
ment of an intention to commence a tender offer that, if successful, would give that person beneficial
ownership of thirty percent or more of the target's stock.
In theory, such a distribution enables the stock and Rights to trade separately. In actuality,
however, most pills give management the power to delay distribution of the Rights certificates even if
the Distribution Date has occurred. Actual distribution of rights certificates has rarely occurred.
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These Rights do, however, contain provisions that become impor-
tant in the event of a hostile takeover attempt. Most common are "flip-
over" provisions, which provide that when a raider successfully obtains
more than a specified percentage of a target's shares, all Right holders
will, if a subsequent merger or other combination or transaction between
target and raider takes place, have the right to purchase a specified
amount of the raider's stock for half its market value. Also common are
"flip-in" provisions, which operate like flip-overs except that they give
each Rights holder the right to purchase for the purchase price of the
Right, an amount of the target company's own common stock worth
twice the purchase price of the Right. For example, a flip-in, once trig-
gered, might give each Right holder the right to buy $500 worth of target
shares for $250.24
24. The term "poison pill" also applies to securities and rights with different sorts of provisions,
including "back-end" provisions, which give each target shareholder except the raider a right to sell
her stock to the target company at a premium price. Revlon, Inc. v. MacAndrews & Forbes Hold-
ings, Inc., 506 A.2d 173 (Del. 1986). involved the effects of a poison pill with such a provision. Most
agree that if the rights available under discriminatory back-end provisions ever became exercisable,
they would violate the SECs all-holders rule, 17 CF.R. § 240.14d-10 (1988). See, ag., CoRPoRATE
ANn-TAKEOVER DEFENsEs, supra note 5, at Intro.-45. Other pill variations include voting provi-
sios that give shareholders other than a raider enhanced voting rights, and provisions that, by
giving shareholders power to redeem a pill by a supermajority vote, mimic the effect of various state
antitakeover statutes. This type of provision has become increasingly popular since the Supreme
Court's decision in CTS Corp. v. Dynamics Corp. of Am., 481 U.S. 69,94 (1987) (upholding Indiana
antitakeover statute that allows acquirers of control shares to vote acquired shares only if majority of
disinterested shareholders grant them voting rights). See, ag., MCA Inc. & Chase Manhattan Bank,
Rights Agreement (July 15, 1987), reprinted in CoRPoRATE ANm-TAKEovER DEFENSEs, supra
note 5, at 2-110 to -175.
Many of these pill provisions have economic effects that resemble the effects of other defensive
tactics not generally considered to be poison pills. For example, a back-end provision giving every
shareholder except a raider the right to sell a portion of her stock to the company at a premium price
functions like a defensive stock-repurchase program, and can be analyzed accordingly. A lively
debate in the law reviews addresses the subject of defensive stock repurchases. See, eg., Bradley &
Rosenzweig, Defensive Stock Repurchases 99 HARV. L. REv. 1377, 1383 (1986) (defensive stock
repurchases unfairly pressure target shareholders to sell and give target managers too great a com-
petitive advantage; they should not be allowed except in the form of self-tenders that seek at least the
number of shares sought by outside bidder and do not prevent outside bidder from tendering its
holdings to target); Gordon & Kornhauser, Takeover Defense Tactics: A Comment on Two Modes
96 YALE LJ. 295, 297 (1986) (examination of academic models used in Macey and McChesney's
and Bradley and Rosenzweig's articles reveals unwarranted assumptions that render authors' con-
clusions invalid) Macey & McChesney, A Theoretical Analysis of Corporate Greenmail 95 YALE
LJ. 13 (1985) (greenmail sometimes improves tender offer prices and efficiently compensates those
who supply information on stock values). Likewise, some of the recent work on dual-class common
stock can contribute to analysis of provisions that enhance certain shareholders' voting rights. See,
ag.o Flschel, Organized Exchanges and the Regulation of Dual Class Common Stock 54 U. CH. L.
REv. 119 (1987) (analyzing difficulty of transferring control under dual-class stock structure and
effects of transfer on economic incentives and shareholder wealth); Gordon, Ti'es that Bond. Dual
Class Common Stock and the Problem of Shareholder Choice, 76 CAUF. L. REv. 1 (1988) (dual-class
recapitalizations may decrease shareholder wealth and create "the fact or appearance of a self-per-
petuating managerial elite"). Finally, pill provisions that create incentives and constraints similar to
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The real reason why Rights exist is to prevent the occurrence of a
"triggering event," an event that activates ffip-over or flip-in provisions.
Flip-over provisions are generally triggered by events that diminish or
destroy the economic value of a target's common stock (such as an ac-
quirer's proposal of a merger in which the target stock will be can-
celed). 25 In such circumstances, the Right "flips over" and becomes a
right to purchase the acquirer's common stock at a bargain price. The
flip-over thus poses a powerful deterrent to any raider who seeks to ac-
quire majority control through a tender offer and then to remove minor-
ity shareholders through a back-end merger. It does nothing, however,
to deter a raider who is content to acquire control of a company without
effecting a back-end merger. For that reason, many recent pills contain
flip-in as well as ffip-over provisions. A host of events, including, in
many cases, the mere acquisition of more than fifty percent of a target's
stock, can trigger a ffip-in.26
Flip-ins generally provide that once a raider (or a raider's affiliate)
acquires any Right, that Right becomes void and may not be exercised.
Thus, a flip-in, when triggered, gives every Right holder except the raider
a virtually irresistible bargain (the right to buy target stock at half the
those created by state takeover statutes can be analyzed like such statutes--also the subject of a vast
literature. See, ,,g., Coffee, The Uncertain Case for Takeover Reform: An Essay on Stockholders;
Stakeholders and Bust-Ups, 1988 Wis. L REv. 435 (1988) (state antitakeover statutes may legiti-
mately protect target shareholders and managers); Romano, The Political Economy of Takeover Stat-
utes. 73 VA. L. REv. 111, 189 (1987) (analyzing effects of state "fair price" statutes).
25. In one recent pill, three occurrences could trigger such a flip-over: (a) a merger or consoli-
dation in which the target is not the surviving entity; (b) a merger or consolidation in which the
target is the surviving entity but all or part of the target's common stock is exchanged for another
party's stock or for cash, or (c) sale of over 50% of the target's assets to another party. Federated
Dep't Stores, Inc. & Manufacturers Hanover Trust Co., Rights Agreement § 13(a) (Jan. 23, 1986)
[hereinafter Federated Pill].
26. For example, the Federated pill provided for triggering of the flip-in any time an "Acquir-
ing Person" (a person who beneficially owns 20% or more of the target stock), id § I(a), engages in
any of a number of transactions with the target, including (a) a merger in which the target company
is the surviving entity with its common stock unchanged, (b) transfers of assets from the Acquiring
Person to the target in exchange for the target's common stock, (c) sales or pledges of target com-
pany assets on terms and conditions less favorable than those obtainable through "arm's-length ne-
gotiation," (d) any transaction at all between the target and the Acquiring Person involving assets of
$10,000,000 or more, (e) any compensation paid to the Acquiring Person by the target (other than
for full-time employment at regular rates), and (f) any loans, guarantees, tax credits, or other finan-
cial assistance from the target to the Acquiring Person. Id. § lI(aXiiXA).
The pill also triggers the flip-in whenever any person becomes beneficial owner of over 50% of
the target's common stock by any means except a tender offer for all shares, approved by a majority
of the board and the target's shareholders, i. § 11(aXiiXB), and whenever any transaction involving
the target that would have the effect of increasing the proportionate holding of an Acquiring Person
by 1% or more, takes place id § lI(aXiiXC).
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market price).27 Once exercised, these rights put substantially more
stock in the Right holders' hands, diluting the raider's holdings.
The current generation of pills gives incumbent management sub-
stantial power and discretion to delay or eliminate a poison pill's deleteri-
ous effects on offerors. Many pills authorize incumbent directors to
suspend the exercise of Rights for a substantial period of time following a
triggering event, and almost every pill now provides that a majority of
incumbent directors can cause the target corporation to redeem the
Rights for a nominal price, thereby removing their deterrent effect on
offerors.28
In sum, poison pills serve two fundamental objectives: (1) they pro-
vide maximum deterrence to hostile offers by severely limiting the ac-
tions that raiders can take without triggering a pill's flip-in or ffip-over
provisions, and (2) they give incumbent board members maximum flexi-
bility to remove a pill's deterrent effects, if and when they decide to do
SO.
27. Since no flip-in or flip-over provisions have ever been triggered, the precise mechanics of
their operation remain unclear. Apparently, however, such provisions would give all Rights holders
except the Acquiring Person a pro rata right to purchase a fixed amount of stock, an amount set by
the average market price of the relevant stock during some period prior to the triggering event.
Thus, in the Federated pill, if an acquirer became beneficial owner of over 50% of target stock by
May 9, 1988, and the average price of target stock over the thirty-day period prior to that time was,
for example, $50, then each Right would in effect become an option to buy 10 shares of the target for
$250. See iU § 7. The Chief Economist's report makes just this assumption concerning the mechan-
ics of flip-overs, see Omncr oF THE CHmF EcooMsr, SEC, supra note 5, at 10-11, as do the
models developed in this Article.
28. Rights plans generally specify a period during which the Rights can be redeemed.'Under
the Federated pill, for example, they can be redeemed at the board's option at any time up to ten
days after a person acquires 20% of the target, and the board can even extend the redemption period
beyond that date by majority vote. Federated Pill, supra note 25, § 23(a). In order to ensure that an
acquirer cannot easily dismantle these provisions by electing a majority of directors to the board or
removing the incumbents, some Rights plans, including Federated's, use the concept of a "Continu-
ing Director." These are defined as any director, not affiliated or associated with an Acquiring
Person, who either sat on the board as of the date of the Rights plan or was subsequently elected to
the board by a majority of the Continuing Directors. Id. § l(g). Only a majority of Continuing
Directors can approve a tender offer or exchange offer;, this restriction prevents an offer's consumma-
tion from triggering the flip-in provisions. Id § I l(aXii)(B). Such a provision theoretically enables
management to suspend a pill's provisions for one offer (the approved one) and keep them in place
for any competing offers.
A New York court, however, has held the use of such "Continuing Director" provisions invalid
under New York law. See Bank of N.Y. Co. v. Irving Bank Corp., 139 Misc. 2d 665, 670-71, 528
N.Y.S.2d 482,485-86 (Sup. Ct), aff'd, 143 A.D.2d 1074, 533 N.Y.S.2d 167 (1988). In CRTF Corp.
v. Federated Dep't Stores, Inc., 683 F. Supp. 422, 441-42 (S.D.N.Y. 1988), a federal district court
considered but refused to rule on the legality of such provisions.
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B. The Problem of Distorted Choice
This section examines the poison pill's effect on both offerors and
target shareholders. As the section will show, the use of a poison pill
creates a distorted-choice problem that is almost a mirror image of the
distorted-choice problem presented by tender offers in the absence of any
defensive tactics. A tender offer for an "unprotected" target has a good
chance of success even if a majority of target shareholders believe that
the value of the consideration offered by the raider is below their estimate
of the value of their shares absent such a transaction. Conversely, a
tender offer for a target effectively protected by a poison pill is likely to
fail even if a majority of target shareholders believe the value of the
transaction offered by the raider is above their valuation of their shares
absent such a transaction.
The "distorted-choice" effect on unprotected targets has been most
fully developed in the legal literature by Lucian Bebchuk. 29 The effect
arises, to some degree, in every offer in which the value available to
tendering shareholders exceeds the value later available to non-tendering
shareholders.30 For example, a perceived disparity will arise if a raider
launches a partial offer and gives target shareholders reason to believe
that after acquiring control, it will depress the value of remaining shares
before proposing a second-step freeze-out transaction. The raider can
publicly announce such a disparity in value by making a front-end-
loaded, two-tier offer that expressly provides greater value for tendered
shares than for shares taken up in the second step.
As an illustration, assume that you are a shareholder of Sitting
Duck Co., a quiet little company with no tender offer defenses. Assume
further that the company's 10,000 shares are publicly traded and that no
one owns more than 1%. Although the stock has recently been selling at
around $80 per share, you believe the company has a bright future and
subjectively value your shares at approximately $100. Moreover (as a
simplifying assumption), you know that other Sitting Duck shareholders
place the same value on their shares.
Opening the paper, you discover that Coercive Co. has announced a
tender offer for Sitting Duck. Coercive is offering to pay $100 cash per
29. Bebchuk, Toward Undisorted Choice and Equal Treatment in Corporate Takeovers, 98
HRv. L. REv. 1693, 1717-33 (1985).
30. Bebchuk points out that even a cash offer for 100% ofa target's shares that is followed by a
second-step merger at the same price involves some disparity in value between the two steps; since
the money available in the second step has a lower time value. Idr at 1710. However, when the
second step follows reasonably quickly after the first, this disparity is relatively slight. The remain-
der of this Article will treat offers for "any and all" target shares as nondistorting (and hence
noncoercive).
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share for up to 6000 shares (or 60%) of Sitting Duck stock. Coercive
also announces its intention to follow the acquisition with a second-step
merger in which it will exchange the remaining 40% of Sitting Duck
shares for debt securities worth $85 per share.
Given the fact that you value Sitting Duck stock at $100 per share,
this offer does not strike you as a particularly good deal. You believe
that the 10,000 outstanding shares of Sitting Duck are worth at least
$1,000,000 in the aggregate, yet Coercive is offering the Sitting Duck
shareholders only $940,000 in aggregate value ((6000 X $100) + (4000
X $85)). Since every other Sitting Duck shareholder agrees with your
valuation, if the shareholders were to vote or otherwise collectively de-
cide whether to accept Coercive's offer, they would reject the deal.
But shareholders do not decide as a group and usually cannot coor-
dinate their responses to an offer. When faced with the individtal deci-
sion whether to tender your shares to Coercive, you confront a different
set of incentives. If you tender and the offer succeeds, you will receive a
blended value of at least $94 per share.31 If you do not tender and the
offer succeeds, you receive only the payment that Coercive offers in the
second-step merger, $85 per share. Furthermore, if you tender and the
offer does not succeed, you get your stock back and stand in the same
position as if you had never tendered at all. Thus, absent any ability to
coordinate with other shareholders, you are best advised to grit your
teeth and tender your shares, even though the amount you expect to re-
ceive falls short of the value you place on your stock.32
The problem of distorted choice also appears in situations in which
poison pills are legal and management has no obligation to redeem a pill
or to prevent it from being triggered. 33 To illustrate the problem in this
context, assume that you hold stock in another company, Porcupine Co.,
which exists under such a legal regime and has a poison pill that contains
flip-over and flip-in provisions with a $250 exercise price.34 Porcupine
also has 10,000 shares outstanding and no large shareholders, and you
and all other shareholders value the stock at $100 per share.
31. The $94 figure assumes a tender of 100% of the shares and proration of the available value.
In fact, since some shareholders always fail to tender, probably slightly more than 60% of the ten-
dered shares will be taken up at the front-end price.
32. Bradley, Desai & Kim, Synergistic Gains froim Corporate Acquiitions and Their Division
Between the Stockholders of Target and Acquiring Firms; 21 J. FIN. ECON. 3, 16 (1988).
33. For a description of this coercive effect on shareholder choice, see OFFICE OF THE CmIF
ECONOMIST, SEC, supra note 5, at 10-12. Professor Michael Jensen apparently first discussed the
effect in his testimony as an expert in Moran v. Household Int'l, Inc., 500 A.2d 1346 (Del. 1985).
See OFFICE OF THE CnEr- ECoNomtsr, SEC, supra note 5, at 12.
34. See supra notes 21-28 and accompanying text.
VoL 1989:54]1
DUKE LAW JOURNAL
Clearly, Coercive's bidding strategy for Sitting Duck would not
work in a bid for Porcupine. In the first place, the strategy would involve
considerably more expense when applied to Porcupine. In addition to
offering $100 per share for the 60% taken in the first step and $85 per
share for the remaining 40%, Coercive would trigger the flip-over rights
of the 40% minority, which would require payment of $1,000,000 (4000
X $250) over and above the $940,000 that Coercive expects to pay for
Porcupine's common stock. Coercive attempts to solve this problem by
abandoning its two-step strategy, tendering for all of Porcupine's shares,
and requiring, as a condition of its offer, that at least 90% of the out-
standing shares (along with their accompanying Rights) be tendered. 35
In doing so, Coercive is offering a deal with an aggregate value of
$1,235,000 ((9000 X $100) + (1000 X $85) + (1000 X $250)), consid-
erably more than the amount at which Porcupine shareholders value
their stock. If the shareholders could coordinate their responses, their
most rational strategy would be to tender the 90% on a pro rata basis,
thus giving each share a blended value of $123.50.
Without such coordination, however, shareholders' individual deci-
sions result in a distorted choice that is the mirror image of the non-
poison-pill scenario. In this case, if you tender and the offer succeeds,
you receive $100 per share. But if you do not tender and the offer suc-
ceeds, you receive $355 per share ($85 for the share and $250 from the
flip-over Right). If the offer does not succeed, it makes no difference
whether you tendered or not. Accordingly, in this scenario, you reluc-
tantly refrain from tendering, and the offer fails, even though it exceeds
your and the other shareholders' valuation of Porcupine's shares.
One important factor, however, distinguishes the two scenarios. In
the poison pill scenario, Porcupine's board has the power to solve the
shareholder-coordination problem by offering to redeem the pill in a ne-
gotiated transaction in which Coercive pays $123.50 for each share. Pre-
sumably, Coercive would have no objection to such a deal, since it has
already offered to pay the same aggregate value for the Porcupine shares.
The question, of course, is whether Porcupine's directors would have any
incentive to make such a deal. 36
Certainly, standard corporate law doctrines give directors a fiduci-
ary duty to act in what they believe are the best interests of sharehold-
35. The Delaware Supreme Court in Moran, 500 A.2d at 1354, suggested this approach as one
of the strategies for defeating poison pills.
36. Incentives play a crucial role. In a non-poison-pill scenario, an offeror has the power to
remove most of the distorted-choice effects simply by changing the terms of its offer to provide equal
value to target shareholders in the first and second steps. This power is quite useless, however, since
an offeror has no incentive to structure its offer in a way that makes it less likely to succeed.
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ers,3 7 and some analyses of takeover defenses assume that target
directors' actions will generally accord with target shareholders' best in-
terests.38 However, the extensive economic literature on agency costs, 39
as well as a healthy skepticism about the propensity for self-sacrifice by
human beings in general and by corporate managers in particular, may
lead one to the opposite conclusion: in a legal regime like the one postu-
lated in the second (Coercive/Porcupine) model, where poison pills are
legal and management has no obligation to redeem or prevent their exer-
cise, management might well refuse to redeem a pill voluntarily even if
the aggregate value offered by a raider exceeded the value of those shares
to the target shareholders.40 Working from this conclusion, the remain-
der of this Article will presume that managerial action results primarily
from incentives and constraints on managers, and not from a desire to
maximize value for shareholders. In the second model, where the legal
regime gives managers no personal incentives to redeem pills and im-
poses no constraints on their failure to do so, this presumption implies
that often no redemption will occur and the offer will fail.
C. The Effect of Legal Uncertainty
The effects seen in the first two models do not apply only to the
polar cases, legal regimes that either proscribe all poison pills or impose
no constraints on their use. The same effects will appear in any legal
regime that clearly establishes, prior to litigation in any particular case,
when management may allow the exercise of poison pills and when man-
agement must redeem them. Under any legal rule that clearly specifies
which situations fall into each of these groups, all participants in a take-
over know whether they are functioning in circumstances that permit the
use of poison pills. Raiders know whether they can obtain an injunction
against a pill's exercise; directors know whether they have an obligation
to redeem a pill. In any such situation, either the incentives and effects
37. See, e-&, N.Y. Bus. CoRP. LAw § 717(a) (McKinney Supp. 1989); Cheffv. Mathes, 41 Del.
Ch. 494, 506, 199 A.2d 548, 555, (1964) (directors discharge duty by showing good faith and reason-
able investigation).
38. See, eg., Lipton, Takeover Bids in the Target's Boardroomn, 35 Bus. LAW. 101, 104 (1979)
(corporate management serves shareholders' long-term interests).
39. See eg., Baysinger & Butler, The Role of Corporate Law in the Theory of the Finn, 28 J.L.
& ECON. 179, 179-82 (1985) (under liberal corporate governance structures, managers will not al-
ways act in shareholders' best interests, since monitoring and bonding costs are high); Jensen &
Meckling, Theory of the Frm: Managerial Behavior, Agency Costm and Ownership Structure 3 J.
FIN. ECON. 305, 308-10 (1976) (agent's decisions and decisions that would maximize wealth of prin-
cipal diverge even at optimal levels of monitoring and bonding).
40. This point does not necessarily imply that, by doing so, management breaches a fiduciary
duty to shareholders. Management may not know at what price target shareholders value their
shares; even if management knows, it may think the shareholders' valuation erroneous.
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described in the first model apply, or the incentives and effects described
in the second model apply. The only situations that might imply a differ-
ent result fall under a third model, in which the participants are uncer-
tain about which legal regime governs their behavior.
In this model, assume that everything is as in the second model,
except that there is a 50% probability that if Porcupine Co.'s manage-
ment fails to redeem the pill prior to the occurrence of a triggering event,
a court will hold that it has breached its fiduciary duty. Of course, there
is also a 50% probability that the court will hold management's failure to
prevent the triggering of the pill perfectly legal.
Coercive, recognizing this 50% probability that it will be operating
under the same legal regime as in the first model (no poison pills), makes
the same offer it made in the first model: $100 cash for the first 60% and
$85 in value for the second-step merger. Recognizing, however, the po-
tentially disastrous consequences of that offer under a legal regime such
as the one in the second model (poison pills allowed), Coercive condi-
tions its offer on either the Porcupine board's redemption of the pill or a
preliminary injunction against the pill's use.41
Coercive has structured its tender offer to maximize benefits and
minimize losses, given legal uncertainty. If the outcome favors Coercive
(a non-poison-pill result), Coercive will obtain a benefit, V, equal to the
value that it would gain by obtaining 100% of the target.42 Presumably,
Coercive has sought to maximize V by, among other things, pricing its
offer at the lowest level it believes would succeed under a non-poison-pill
41. Such conditional offers for companies protected by poison pills have become common. See.
eg., In re Damon Corp. Stockholders Litig. (Nomad Acquisition Corp. v. Damon Corp.), (1988-
1989 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L Rep. (CCH) I 94,040, at 90,870 (Del. Ch. Sept. 16, 1988) (offer
conditioned on redemption of Rights plan).
42. Strictly speaking, the value of V is the difference between the profit Coercive expects to
recognize on its acquisition of the target (i.e., the value of the target to Coercive minus its acquisition
cost, including associated transaction costs) and the next most profitable use of the funds with which
Coercive is making the acquisition. If we indulge the standard assumption that Coercive acts in an
economically rational manner, then Coercive must believe that purchasing target shares is the best-
i.e., most profitable-use of the available funds. Accordingly, if as a result of the operation of the
poison pill Coercive cannot make that investment, it will be forced to employ its funds in a way that
it, by definition, finds less desirable (presumably because less profitable).
The opportunity to purchase target shares has a positive value of V for Coercive, and the loss of
that opportunity represents a detriment, or cost, of an equivalent amount. While the company could
not recognize such a loss on its books, nor deduct such a loss on its income tax returns, a rational,
profit-maximizing firm nevertheless has an incentive to avoid such a loss. The loss, therefore, is
nonetheless "real" in an economic sense. See generally P. SAMUELSON & W. NoRDHAus, ECONOM-
ics 469-72 (12th ed. 1985) (opportunity costs are real economic costs). My argument requires only a
recognition that companies making tender offers have an incentive to maximize V and to avoid the
loss of V that would result from an unsuccessful offer.
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regime.43 If the legal outcome is unfavorable (exercise of the pill is per-
mitted), Coercive will simply withdraw its offer. While Coercive will find
this result preferable to incurring the very high costs that triggering the
flip-in or flip-over provisions of the pill would bring about, the result
carries costs of its own. Withdrawing the offer means a loss of the benefit
that Coercive hoped to obtain through a successful deal-that is, a loss of
V. In addition, even if it withdraws the offer, Coercive will lose certain
sunk costs, call them Z including commitment fees, legal and printing
fees, and the time that Coercive executives spent preparing the offer.
If we look at a regime of legal uncertainty from Coercive's stand-
point, then, it presents a risk, with an upside potential of a gain of V, and
a downside risk of a loss of V+& In short, given any positive value for
, that is, any offer that involves some sunk costs, an offeror's loss from
losing a poison pill suit always exceeds the benefit of winning one.44
Consider the same situation from the standpoint of Porcupine's
managers, who operate under the same degree of uncertainty, albeit with
a different definition of which result is favorable and which is unfavora-
ble. In a favorable scenario for them, they are permitted to exercise the
pill if they choose, Coercive withdraws its offer, and the Porcupine man-
agers preserve the status quo, i.e., they maintain their control and the
benefits that accrue to them by virtue of that control. Define C as the
value that management puts on maintaining control.
An unfavorable result for management, on the other hand, can take
one of three forms, depending on the timing of the judicial decision that
proscribes the managers' failure to redeem the pill. In the event of mo-
tion for a preliminary injunction, such a ruling would occur prior to con-
summation of Coercive's offer. In that event, the offer would succeed,
and the cost to management would be no more than C, and possibly
some lesser amount if, as often occurs, stock options or golden
parachutes mitigate the loss of C If, however, no ruling occurs until
after management's failure to redeem the pill has forced Coercive to
withdraw its offer, a subsequent lawsuit, probably by target shareholders,
43. Since it has conditioned its offer on the redemption or invalidation of the pill, Coercive can
price its offer as if the poison pill were not a factor.
44. This does not mean, of course, that an offeror will always seek to avoid such a suit. If an
offeror has a sufficiently optimistic view of its chances of succeeding in such a suit, it might still
consider the suit worth pursuing. For example, if the offeror stands to win only S100 from a success-
ful suit, and lose S200 from an unsuccessful one, it should still bring the suit if the chances of success
are greater than or equal to 75%. See infta note 50.
Moreover, in an auction contest, the losing bidder's loss of V+S may be lessened or even offset
by the profit that the bidder makes by tendering previously purchased target shares into the higher
offer. In a single-bidder situation, in contrast, an offeror stopped by a poison pill will probably
experience a loss on previously purchased target stock, the value of which is likely to drop once the
offeror abandons the offer.
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would carry a much larger potential cost to the managers: the share-
holder group's loss of the premium offered in the deal. Call this value
from the loss of the deal D. An even more disastrous scenario for man-
agement would be to permit the triggering of the flip-in or ffip-over provi-
sions, dilute the raider, and then lose a suit by the raider for the damages
caused by that dilution. Call this value, the cost of illegally triggering the
flip-in or flip-over provisions, F 45
This model helps to explain why parties have strong incentives to
obtain some judicial resolution of the redemption issue prior to an offer's
consummation or abandonment. From the perspective of a raider, who
will only consummate the merger if a court orders redemption or in-
validates the pill, the incentive is obvious. Either an unfavorable judicial
resolution or a failure to obtain such resolution results in the same loss to
the raider, V+S. The model also indicates why target management
might want to obtain such a resolution prior to an offer's consummation
or abandonment. 46 Assuming that D or F, management's potential loss
from a raider's lawsuit after an offer is withdrawn or a pill triggered,
exceeds C (or the fraction of C that management will actually lose if the
offer is consummated), then management has an interest in seeking judi-
cial resolution prior to the consummation or withdrawal of the tender
offer, since that is when it faces the lowest potential loss from an unfavor-
able result.
An interesting asymmetry exists, however, in the possible results of
such judicial resolution, which is most likely to follow a raider's motion
for a preliminary injunction requiring management to redeem a poison
pill. A preliminary injunction will, of course, take away managemefnt's
discretion whether or not to redeem the pill. But a denial of such an
injunction will neither prohibit management from redeeming the pill nor
ensure the legality of a subsequent failure to redeem. This continuing
45. It seems extremely unlikely that any ofleror would actually sustain a loss ofF, since such a
loss could arise only from purchases of shares while an unredeemed pill remained outstanding, some-
thing an offeror would almost never do. The only scenario I can envision in which such an event
might occur involves litigation uncertainty. Most raiders condition tender offers on obtaining pre-
liminary injunctive relief invalidating a pill or ordering its redemption. If a trial court ordered such
invalidation or redemption, an offeror, relying on that order, might subsequently purchase target
shares. If the trial court's order were reversed on appeal, the pill arguably could come back into
effect, with its flip-in or flip-over provisions already triggered. Admittedly, even this scenario as-
sumes a somewhat irrational (or at least unsophisticated) offeror. In the Grand Metropolitan-Pills-
bury takeover, in contrast, even after Grand Met had obtained judicial invalidation of Pillsbury's
poison pill, it did not actually purchase shares until it and Pillsbury's management reached a subse-
quent agreement (which presumably included dismissal of any pending appeals). Gibson & Smith,
Pillsbury Agrees to $5.75 Billion Offer by Grand Met After Poison Pill Is Struck down in Delaware
Court, Wall St. J., Dec. 19, 1988, at A3, col. I.
46. This would not be true when management seeks limited delay in order to develop a superior
offer.
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uncertainty follows from the nature of preliminary injunction rulings,
which have no claim-preclusive or issue-preclusive effect.47 More impor-
tantly, courts commonly decide such motions on grounds such as lack of
irreparable injury, which provide little or no guidance on how the court
might ultimately rule on the substantive issue of redemption.
48
These considerations help to explain why so many poison pill cases
settle before a court has finally determined whether target management
has satisfied its fiduciary duty with respect to redemption.49 Assume that
a court either has not yet decided a raider's motion seeking redemption
of a pill or has decided the motion on grounds that do not determine
management's fiduciary duty with respect to redemption. Assume too
that each side perceives a 50% probability of a result adverse to it. The
raider, facing a 50% chance of a gain of V and a 50% chance of a loss of
V+S sees a greater potential for downside loss than for upside gain if
the case proceeds to final resolution. Similarly, management, assuming
that its potential liability for damages in the amount of D or F exceeds
the-value of C, also faces a greater downside loss than upside gain if the
matter proceeds to final resolution. In such a scenario, both sides have
an incentive to eliminate the possibility of downside loss by settling the
case.50
In short, as long as there exists a substantial possibility that manage-
ment can legally trigger a pill, raiders have a strong incentive to remove
47. Both issue and claim preclusion require a final judgment on the merits. See RESTATEMENT
(SEFCND) OF JuDGmErs §§ 13, 27 (1982). Moreover, the results of a preliminary injunction mo-
tion do not bind a court in subsequent proceedings in the same case.
48. Indeed, because the issue of whether a court should force target management to redeem a
pill arises while management still has the option to redeem the pill, a court can easily decline to
decide the issue, either for lack of ripeness or lack of irreparable injury. See, eg., Doskocil Cos. v.
Griggy, No. 10,095, slip op. at 7 (Del. Ch. Aug. 18, 1988) (Westlaw, 1988 WL 85491) (issue not ripe
because target company's directors "have not yet decided to take any action" to activate pill); Facet
Enters. v. Prospect Group, Inc., No. 9746, slip op. at 6 (Del. Ch. Apr. 15, 1988) (Westlaw, 1988 WL
36140) (denying preliminary injunction prohibiting enforcement of Rights; auction would soon take
place).
49. Even in the case of court-ordered redemption, both sides have incentives to settle in order
to avoid further litigation, including the possibility of reversal on appeal, see supra note 45, and the
desire to make a relatively orderly transition of control. Of course, since the trial court's order in
such a case dramatically alters the relative probabilities of outcome, one would expect such a settle-
ment to involve a relatively small increase in the price offered to target shareholders.
50. The situation resembles a two-player game in which each player stands an equal chance of
winning SI00 or losing S200. A risk-neutral person should not only refuse to play such a game, but
should be willing to pay $50 to avoid playing. One can compute the certainty equivalent for a risk-
neutral person as follows:
Probability Outcome (return) Value
.50 $100 $5O
.50 -(S200) ($100)
1.00 ($50)
DUKE LAW JOURNAL
that possibility through negotiation, and as long as there is a substantial
possibility that, in failing to redeem the pill, management may be found
to have breached its fiduciary duties, management has a strong incentive
to remove that possibility through negotiation. When both parties have
strong incentives to remove litigation uncertainty, the likely result is a
negotiated settlement.51
Incumbent management can also seek to remove the danger of a
downside loss in another way, by developing a competing, higher offer.
The use of a poison pill as a "gavel" to run an auction, largely by giving
targets far more than the twenty business days specified by the Williams
Act 52 to develop competing bids, is becoming well-established. 53 Here
again, a significant degree of uncertainty about the appropriate use of
poison pills seems to facilitate the auction process.
If there were a definite time period after which a raider could
purchase shares without worrying about dilution by a poison. pill, then an
inadequate offer would always have a chance of succeeding because ex-
traneous factors delayed a potentially higher offer. Indeed, the amount
of time needed for developing competing offers may vary considerably,
depending on the nature of the company and transaction involved. Un-
Of course, a risk-averse player would be willing to pay even more to get out of the game. See
generally W. KLEIN & J. COFFEE, BusINmss ORGANIZATION AND FINANCE 208-16 (3d ed. 1988),
from which this chart is adapted.
This model suggests that a party will have an incentive to settle whenever the product of the
probability and the magnitude of the downside outcome exceeds the product of the probability and
the magnitude of the upside outcome. The model is consistent with much of the literature on
settlement, which acknowledges the role of pessimism in inducing settlements. See, eg., Posner, The
Summary Jury Trial and Other Methods of Alternative Dispute Resolution: Some Cautionary
Observations, 53 U. CI. L. REv. 366, 370 (1986) (introducing mathematical model for settlement
process, in which "if both parties are pessimistic... the case will be settled"); Priest & Klein, The
Selection ofDisputesforLitigation, 13 J. LEGAL STUD. 1, 13 (1984) (same). The model departs from
that literature, however, and agrees with Professor Schuck in positing that when both sides face
substantial downside outcomes, an increase in uncertainty can create incentives to settle. See
Schuck, The Role of Judges in Settling Complex Cases; The Agent Orange Example, 53 U. CHI. L
REy. 337, 353 (1986) (in Agent Orange case, Judge Weinstein induced settlement by separately
explaining each side's case's weaknesses to that side).
51. The presence of an incentive to achieve a negotiated settlement does not mean that settle-
ment will actually occur. Strategic behavior, miscalculation, and just plain orneriness lead parties to
fail to settle even when both sides have incentives to do so.
52. 15 U.S.C. § 78n(e) (1982); 17 C.F.R. § 240.14e-l(a) (1988).
53. Authority for this use of poison pills apparently first derived from language in Revlon, Inc.
v. MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings, Inc., 506 A.2d 173, 181 (Del. 1986), an opinion that praised the
use of a back-end pill for "spurr[ing] the bidding to new heights." The appropriations of such a use
of a poison pill was moot, however, by the time that case was decided: the board had agreed to
redeem the pill as part of a negotiated transaction. Id. Since that time, use of the pill to benefit an
auction has also been approved in CRTF Corp. v. Federated Dep't Stores, Inc., 683 F. Supp. 422,
440-43 (S.D.N.Y. 1988) and Facet Enters. v. Prospect Group, Inc., No. 9746, slip op. at 6 (Del. Ch.
Apr. 15, 1988) (Westlaw, 1988 WL 36140).
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certainty concerning the amount of extra time created by the poison pill
both limits the raider's ability to "grab" the company prematurely and
creates an incentive for management to develop alternatives expedi-
tiously and not to search indefinitely. As the Delaware Court of Chan-
cery recently demonstrated in Grand Metropolitan, Public Ltdl Co. v.
Pillsbury Co., at some uncertain point, the extra time provided by the use
of the pill can expire.-s
II. THE UNCERTAINTY OF POISON PILL LAW
This part considers the current degree of uncertainty in the law gov-
erning poison pills, particularly in Delaware law. It then considers the
sources of that uncertainty and the forces tending toward greater or
lesser certainty and predictability in poison pill litigation. The part con-
cludes that while courts will undoubtedly decide many more poison pill
cases in the future, the question in particular cases whether management
can use poison pills or must redeem them will remain substantially
uncertain.
One should note that the "substantial" uncertainty necessary to cre-
ate an incentive to settle can be far less than the 50% level used in the
preceding models.55 Indeed, such a probability, implying pure random-
ness of result, is unlikely in most cases in a developed legal regime. Even
a much lower level of uncertainty, however, can create powerful incen-
tives to settle, given the very large costs likely to be incurred either by a
raider who triggers and is diluted by a poison pill or by a board held to
have illegally triggered such dilution.56
Of course, a blanket prohibition of poison pills, adopted by statute
or judicial decision, would eliminate any uncertainty about their use. A
number of courts have in fact held that certain types of pill provisions,
generally flip-ins that discriminate against offerors, violate state corpo-
rate law.57 In those states, little uncertainty about the use of such poison
pills remains. Courts or legislatures in other states, however, have recog-
54. See [1988-1989 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L Rep. (CCH) 1 94,104, at 91,188, 91,190,
91,195 (De. CI. Dec. 16, 1988).
55. See supra note 50.
56. For example, a director who values her continuing position of control at 5100,000 has a
strong incentive to settle a case in which her potential liability is $1,000,000, even if the director
believes there is only a 10% chance of losing the case.
57. Spinner Corp. v. Princeville Dev. Corp., No. 86-0701, slip op. (D. Haw. Oct. 31, 1986)
(enjoining fip.in and back-end provisions as unlawfully discriminatory under Colorado law); Amal-
gamated Sugar Co. v. NL Indus., 644 F. Supp. 1229, 1234o(S.D.N.Y. 1986) (holding flip-in ultra
vires under New Jersey law), aff'd, 825 F.2d 634 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 108 S. Ct. 511 (1987); Bank
of N.Y. Co. v. Irving Bank Corp., 139 Misc. 2d 665, 670-71, 528 N.Y.S.2d 482, 485-86 (Sup. Ct.)
(enjoining Rights plan with "Continuing Director" provision), aff'd, 143 A.D.2d 1074, 533
N.Y.S.2d 167 (1988).
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nized that typical poison pill provisions do not violate corporate
statutes.58
The same asymmetry noted above in the preliminary injunction con-
text59 appears here as well. While a prohibition of poison pills implies
certainty about the inappropriateness of their use, public-law acceptance
of pills provides no concomitant certainty about when and how manage-
ment may use them. 60
A. The Current State of Delaware Law
Current Delaware law aptly illustrates this uncertainty. In the lead-
ing Delaware case concerning poison pills, Moran v. Household Interna-
tionaL Inc., the Delaware Supreme Court held that Household's flip-over
poison pill, which the company adopted prior to any hostile offer, was
not a per se violation of Delaware law.61 The court went on to consider
whether the board's decision to adopt the pill was a valid exercise of
fiduciary duty. Finding that the board had decided based on adequate
information and that its action was "reasonable in relation to the threat
posed,"'62 the court held that the board's action was protected by the
business judgment rule.6 3
The court warned, however, that neither its ruling on the formal
legality of Household's pill nor its approval of the board's actions in
adopting the pill provided any basis for concluding whether or under
what circumstances the board could validly exercise the pill. As the
court stated, "[tihe ultimate response to an actual takeover bid must be
58. See, eg., Wis. STAT. ANN. § 180.155 (West Supp. 1988); Gelco Corp. v. Coniston Partners,
652 F. Supp. 829, 847-49 (D. Minn. 1986) (in action to preliminarily enjoin target's pill, court, after
finding lack of irreparable harm to plaintiff takeover group, nonetheless went on to consider likeli-
hood of success on merits and held flip-in provisions not ultra vires under Minnesota law), aff'd in
part and vacated in parm 811 F.2d 414, 420 (8th Cir. 1987) (vacating holding on flip-in provisions,
since "[aifter determining there was not irreparable harm... the district court was not required to
go further"); Dynamics Corp. of Am. v. CTS Corp., 637 F. Supp. 406, 409, 416 (N.D. Ill.) (finding
poison pill not a per se violation of Indiana common law, although adoption constituted breach of
fiduciary duty in that case), aff' d 794 F.2d 250 (7th Cir. 1986), rev'd on other grounds 481 U.S. 69
(1987); Moran v. Household Int'l, Inc., 500 A.2d 1346, 1356-57 (Del. 1985) (defendant corporation's
flip-over pill did not by its terms violate Delaware law and adoption was legitimate exercise of busi-
ness judgment); see also Stricharchuk & Stewart, Goodyear Tire to Buy Interest from Sir James Wall
St. J., Nov. 21, 1986, at 3, col. 1, col. 2 (discussing temporary Ohio statute validating poison pills,
passed in connection with proposed takeover of Goodyear).
59. See supra notes 47-48 and accompanying text.
60. See infra notes 64-65 and accompanying text.
61. 500 A.2d at 1353.
62. ri at 1356. The court was applying the "proportionality" test that it had enunciated in
Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co., 493 A.2d 946, 955 (Del. 1985) ("If a defensive measure is to
come within the ambit of the business judgment rule, it must be reasonable in relation to the threat
posed.").
63. 500 A.2d at 1356-57.
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judged by the Directors' actions at that time, and nothing we say here
relieves them of their basic and fundamental duties to the corporation
and its stockholders.""
Thus, in light of Moran, Delaware courts view a board's decision
not to redeem a pill as a defensive tactic separate from the board's deci-
sion to adopt the pill and apply separate proportionality review to this
decision not to redeem.65 This development initially led some to expect
that the caselaw would soon generate specific rules defining and delineat-
ing the precise circumstances under which management has an obliga-
tion to redeem a poison pill,66 and the specific circumstances under
which it has no such obligation.
Although Delaware courts have now decided quite a few poison pill
cases, no such clear and precise rules have emerged. Rather, Delaware
seems to have purposely avoided clarifying the loose standard governing
poison pill redemption (and defensive tactics generally), a standard that
relies on such notoriously vague concepts as "reasonableness" and "pro-
portionality." 67 That standard has permitted the Delaware courts to
64. Id. at 1357 (citing Unocal 493 A.2d at 954-55, 958). The court also stated:
When the Household Board of Directors is faced with a tender offer and a request to
redeem the Rights, ... [t]hey will be held to the same fiduciary standards any other board
of directors would be held to in deciding to adopt a defensive mechanism, the same stan-
dard as they were held to in originally approving the Rights Plan.
Id at 1354 (again citing Unocal) (emphasis added).
65. The court's citations to Unocal indicate that the same "proportionality" test applies to the
decision to redeem as applies to other defensive tactics. Subsequent Delaware cases have in fact
applied the proportionality test to the redemption issue. See infra note 83 and accompanying text.
66. These commentators usually acknowledge the confusing or uncertain state of current law,
while assuming that new cases will resolve that confusion eventually. Se4 eg. Brodsky, Poison
Pills, N.Y.LJ., Sept. 17, 1986, at 1, col. I (noting that current case-by-case approach "mak[es]
predictability difficult" but that future cases will determine "(w]hether courts... refuse] to apply
the business judgment rule to takeover defenses," "adopt the [Unocal]" approach, "or... take some
other approach"); see also Booth, The Emerging Conflict Between Federal Securities Law and State
Corporation Law, 12 . Co RP. L 73, 101-03 (1986) (noting that recent Delaware cases have gener-
ated "confusion," but that "the courts of Delaware (and other states) must continue to fashion the
substance of fiduciary duty").
67. We can divide legal principles into two general categories. First are "rules," which limit
factual inquiry in order to achieve certainty and predictability of result. For example, only two
relatively uncontrovertible facts are relevant to a determination of when a tender offer may be con-
summated: when the offer began and when 20 business days have expired. Second are "standards,"
which denote looser legal principles that permit consideration of more factors in the hope of ob-
taining a more individualized and equitable result. For example, Rule lOb-5's prohibition of all
"fraudulent and deceptive" practices may not very clearly define the conduct being prohibited, but
most believe that the Rule's vagueness itself aids the Rule's deterrent effect and effective enforce-
ment. While these two categories are, of course, relative, Delaware's law governing defensive tactics
seems to resemble a "standard" much more than a "rule." As the text illustrates, courts sometimes
find vague standards more useful than precise rules. See generally Kennedy, Form and Substance in
Private Law Adjudication, 89 HARv. L REv. 1685 (1976) (identifying two opposed modes for deal-
ing with questions about the form that legal solutions should take: a formal mode that favors de-
DUKE LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 1989:54
engage in wide-ranging factual inquiries to test the "reasonableness" and
"proportionality" of managers' conduct.68 Wary of any attempt to legis-
late in this area, the Delaware courts do not even try to enunciate a more
specific "test" or limit the factors relevant to the issue of poison pill re-
demption. Rather, each decision tends to provide a detailed factual de-
scription of the transaction at issue, followed by a determination that
management's response does or does not meet the proportionality test.69
Since every case involves a different transaction, case outcomes cannot
logically conflict in such a situation. 70 Any attempt, however, to identify
one or two dispositive factors in one case is rebuttable by another case in
which the same factors were present and lacked dispositive effect. 7'
A loose legal standard like the proportionality test contributes to
legal uncertainty in two ways. First, courts' identification of a panoply of
relevant factors with no ranking among them makes predicting outcomes
difficult, even as precedent develops. 72 Moreover, a loose standard per-
mits courts to look not just at the terms of a tender offer, but also at all
the various participants in the takeover contest, their personalities, their
fined, general rules, and an equitable mode that produces ad hoc decisions with little precedential
value).
68. Any "reasonableness" test, such as the Unocal proportionality test, tends to be highly con-
text-specific and fact-sensitive. A defensive tactic that is reasonable with respect to one offer (for
example, a two-tier offer with junk bonds on the back end and a relatively low premium) might well
prove unreasonable with respect to an offer involving different terms or a different offeror. Delaware
caselaw since Unocal tends to reflect this highly fact-specific approach.
69. Robert M. Bass Group, Inc. v. Evans, 552 A.2d 1227 (Del. Ch. 1988), provides a good
illustration. In that case, which involved a motion for a preliminary injunction against a manage-
ment restructuring by Macmillan, Inc., designed to defeat a takeover attempt by the Bass Group,
Vice-Chancellor Jacobs spent nine and one-half pages discussing the background facts, one-half of a
page describing the general legal standards involved, two pages discussing whether the Bass Group
was a "threat," and five pages discussing whether the defensive restructuring was reasonable.
70. In re Damon Corp. Stockholders Litig. (Nomad Acquisition Corp. v. Damon Corp.),
[1988-1989 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 94,040, at 90,868 (DeL Ch. Sept. 16, 1988),
decided a few months after Bast also involved a defensive restructuring. Although the restructur-
ings in the two cases had many common characteristics, Vice-Chancellor Hartnett had no trouble
distinguishing the case, "because in [Bas,] the record showed that the board acted with an entrench-
ment motive." Id. at 90,871.
71. In Facet Enters. v. Prospect Group, Inc., No. 9746, slip op. at 6 (Del. Ch. Apr. 15, 1988)
(Westlaw, 1988 WL 36140), Vice-Chancellor Jacobs noted precisely these aspects of current Dela-
ware law:
The rapidly evolving law makes any precise legal formulation in this fast moving area a
somewhat hazardous endeavor that is best left for another day. For purposes of this mo-
tion it is sufficient to note that in each of these cases the result was highly fact specific, and
that none of those cases involved the exact circumstances presented here.
72. Consider a case for which two arguably relevant precedents exist. In case one, the court
held that a transaction with characteristics a, b, and c constituted a threat sufficient to justify man-
agement's refusal to redeem a poison pill. In case two, the court held that a transaction with charac-
teristics a, x, and y did not pose such a threat. In such a situation, it is impossible to predict the
outcome of a case involving a transaction with factors a, b, and x.
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past actions, and their future policies for the target company.73 Given
this broad array of factors, each side in future cases will likely be able to
come up with some particulars in which the offer at issue seems either
less threatening than offers in cases enjoining the use of poison pills, or
even more threatening than offers in other cases permitting the use of
pills. As a result, each side will be able to make some fairly plausible
arguments, arguments that will pose a substantial possibility of defeat for
the other side.
A second source of uncertainty from a loose standard is the con-
trovertibility of the facts themselves.74 A standard like proportionality
increases the quantity of potentially relevant facts about a transaction
and the parties to it, making it more likely that at least some facts will
become the subject of serious dispute. Furthermore, proportionality re-
view permits inquiry into certain kinds of factual issues whose resolution
is often unpredictable. Expert opinions concerning valuation, for exam-
ple, are notoriously open to critique and rebuttal by equally persuasive
experts. Determinations of motive and intent may also be crucial to a
case's outcome, yet difficult to predict in advance.
Substantive legal standards aside, the procedural posture of most
pill cases also creates litigation uncertainty. As part I demonstrates, 75
both sides in a poison pill case have incentives to seek adjudication of the
redemption issue while the tender offer is pending. As a result, most pill
cases involve preliminary injunction motions that seek redemption or in-
validation of a pill before a takeover is completed. This procedural pos-
ture leads to very narrow, often entirely nonsubstantive rulings. Until
recently, these rulings have generally fallen into two categories-those in
which courts deny relief on purely procedural grounds, such as unripe-
ness or lack of irreparable injury,76 and those in which courts deny relief
because they find management's failure to redeem pills reasonable in
light of a promised or pending auction contest. 7 Even in these latter
cases, however, courts limit their findings of reasonableness to the precise
73. See Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co., 493 A.2d 946, 956 (Del. 1985) (corporate raider's
"national reputation as a 'greenmailer'" was a relevant consideration).
74. See generally Frank, What Courts Do in Fact, 26 ILL. L. RFv. 645, 649 (1932) ("The 'facts'
of a 'contested' case, for judicial purposes, are not what actually happened between the parties but
what the court tin happened.").
75. See supra notes 41-46 and accompanying text.
76. See supra note 48 and accompanying text.
77. See, a, CRTF Corp. v. Federated Dep't Stores, Inc., 683 F. Supp. 422, 441 (S.D.N.Y.
1988), BNS Inc. v. Koppers Co., 683 F. Supp. 458, 476 (D. Del. 1988); Tate & Lyle PLC v. Staley
Continental, Inc., [1987-1988 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) T 93,764, at 98,586 (Del.
Ch. May 9, 1988).
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time at which each motion is decided.73 As part I likewise shows, in the
face of such a nonresult, parties will most likely seek such a negotiated
settlement.7 9 Awareness of this pressure to settle may well contribute to
courts' unwillingness"to issue definitive rulings on poison pill issues.
In the fall of 1988, the Delaware Court of Chancery and Supreme
Court decided a number of cases involving poison pills. In the Macmil-
lan, 80 Interco, 81 and Pillsbury8 2 decisions, Delaware courts for the first
78. For example, in Federated, 683 F. Supp. at 44243, Judge Sand stated his concern that a
definitive ruling would do more harm than good and thus limited his ruling not just to that case, but
to that point in the proceedings. He warned the target's management that his refusal to grant the
plaintiff an injunction at that point in the case did not mean that he would refuse to grant one later.
See also Koppers 683 F. Supp. at 474 ("board's responses thus far have been reasonable" (emphasis
added)).
79. See supra notes 47-49 and accompanying text.
80. M Iills Acquisition Co. v. Macmillan, Inc., [1988-1989 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L Rep.
(CCHI) t 94,071, at 91,024 (Del. Ch. Oct. 17, 1988), rev'd, [Current Transfer Binder] idt 94,401, at
92,602 (Del. May 3, 1989). The case primarily involved the propriety of an auction contest con-
ducted by a target that favored one of the competing offerors. Although the Delaware Supreme
Court reversed the Chancery's determination that the deficiencies in the auction procedures were not
sufficient to invalidate the auction, it did not disturb the "limited injunction" in which the Chancery
Court ordered removal of the poison pill because once "the two highest bids [were] on the table," ia
f 94,071, at 91,024, the pill's purpose had been served. Indeed, that injunction had not been chal-
lenged by either party on. appeal. See Macmillan, id 94,401, at 92,595.
81. City Capital Assocs. v. Interco Inc., 551 A.2d 787 (DeL Ch. 1988). Interco involved a
tender offer for Interco at S74 per share. In response, the Interco board sought to implement a
restructuring of the company, which it valued at "at least" S76 per share. To prevent the consum-
mation of the tender offer, and to ensure the success of its alternative restructuring, the board re-
fused to redeem the outstanding poison pill. Id. at 793-94.
The chancery court, in requirifig redemption of the pill, noted that the Interco was no longer
using the pill to conduct an auction or otherwise seek to obtain a more valuable alternative to the
tender offer. Such an alternative, the proposed restructuring, had already been obtained, and the pill
at that point served only to prevent shareholders from selecting the other alternative, the proposed
tender offer. The court held that the "threat" avoided by the pill, the possibility that shareholders
would erroneously choose the less valuable alternative, did not justify use of the pill to deprive
shareholders of the opportunity to make that choice. IA at 798.
82. Grand Metro., Pub. Ltd. Co. v. Pillsbury Co., (1988-1989 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L
Rep. (CCH) f 94,104, at 91,188 (Del. Ch. Dec. 16, 1988). Pillsbury involved Grand Met's fully
financed cash tender offer for all outstanding shares of Pillsbury; the offer commenced on October 4,
1988. Id at 91,189. The $63 offer price represented a 60% premium over the shares' prior market
price. Grand Met conditioned its offer on redemption of Pillsbury's poison pill. Id. at 91,190.
In early November, as the period of the tender neared expiration, Grand Met sought a prelimi-
nary injunction ordering redemption of the pill. Id When that motion was denied, Grand Met
extended its offer but did not purchase any of the tendered shares, since such a purchase would have
triggered the provisions of the (thus far unredeemed) poison pill. Id at 91,193. Pillsbury, mean-
while, had announced a proposed restructuring that involved a spin-off of certain assets, notably its
Burger King operations. Pillsbury's experts estimated that the restructuring promised shareholders
at least $68 in value per share, but that the value would not be realized until 1992 or 1993. Id at
91,194. By the time Grand Met's preliminary injunction motion was again before the court on
December 16, 1988, 87% of the outstanding Pillsbury shares had been tendered to Grand Met. L
In granting the injunction and ordering redemption of the pill, the court noted these factors:
(1) the offer posed no "threat" to the corporate entity or any other constituency (indeed, the court
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time granted preliminary injunctions invalidating or requiring redemp-
tion of poison pills. Yet these decisions, while they undoubtedly provide
insight into the Delaware judiciary's views on these matters, have not
made management decisions about poison pills any more certain.
None of these decisions announce any new legal rules. Rather, they
all purport to apply the Unocal proportionality standard to facts that
each case describes as unique and highly particularized.8 3 Moreover,
each of the cases turns on factual determinations, most importantly the
"adequacy" of the prices offered, 84 that will raise uncertain and hotly
litigated issues in any future takeover contest.
Nonetheless, these decisions do indeed change the law, by revealing
new and important information about the attitudes of the Delaware
courts. One would be mistaken, however, to assume that simply because
the law has changed, it has necessarily become more certain. For exam-
ple, the Interco case seems to create an operational rule that management
may not use poison pills to protect its favored alternative in a contest
where two adequate offers are available and shareholders might reason-
ably favor either one.8 5 This is indeed new information, and in that sense
a "clarification" of existing law, but the rule also mandates new inquiries
regarding the "adequacy" and "reasonableness" of competing offers, thus
engendering new uncertainty and contentious new factual issues.
The Pillsbury case also illustrates this phenomenon. It has been cor-
rectly described as refuting the so-called "just say no" defense-the view
that management may always use a pill to prevent an offer that it deems
inadequate. 6 The Pilsbury court found management's decision not to
redeem the pill "unreasonable" on that case's facts, demonstrating that,
at least in some circumstances, incumbent management cannot "just say
no." Since we now know that management may not always use a pill to
prevent the consummation of an offer that it deems inadequate, the ques-
stated that 50% of the shares in the Pillsbury employee pension plan had been tendered); (2) 87% of
the Pillsbury shares had been tendered; (3) a reasonable shareholder could see it in her best interest
to lake $63 then, rather than a potential S68 in 1992 as a result of the proposed restructuring; (4) the
real "threat posed" to shareholder value was a withdrawal of the Grand Met offer if the pill was left
in place;, and (5) in over two months, no competing higher offers for Pillsbury had emerged. Id at
91,193.
83. Pillsbury [1988-1989 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) at 91,192-93; Interco, 551
A.2d at 797-98; Macmillan. [1988-1989 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) at 91,021.
84. Pillsbury [1988-1989 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) at 91,193; Interco, 551
A.2d at 797-98; Macmillan, [1988-1989 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) at 91,021.
85. See the discussion ofInterco's facts, supra note 81.
86. Gibson & Smith, supra note 45, at A3, cols. 3-4 (quoting a lawyer for Grand Met after the
Pllsbury decision was announced as saying: "You remember [takeover lawyer Martin Lipton, an
advocate of the poison pill defense] being quoted as saying you can just say no? Apparently, you
can't." (quoting Allen Finkelson (insertion in original))).
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tion becomes, when is such action permissible and when is it impermissi-
ble? While the Pillsbury decision may satisfy academic lawyers by
resolving a preexisting legal debate, it is unlikely to make things any
more certain for practitioners who must advise boards when they are
now permitted to "say no."87
B. Pressures Toward Certainty
Although the cases decided thus far have not increased the law's
certainty or predictability, Delaware courts will certainly continue to de-
cide poison pill cases; one could argue that as these cases get decided, the
law surely must become more certain and predictable. Two basic argu-
ments, one based on judicial action and the other on the responses of the
corporate bar, support this position. The judicial action argument relies
on the importance of precedent in any process of case-by-case adjudica-
tion. Fundamental ideas of fairness, in this view, require judges to take
prior decisions into account in deciding the cases before them. To do so,
they must interpret those prior decisions in a way that transforms them
into the best and most coherent statements of the legal principles in-
volved. According to this argument, then, by aiming at consistency, the
process of adjudication always moves towards greater certainty, although
it never attains absolute certainty. 8
This argument assumes that, to make sense of and consistently ap-
ply their prior decisions, judges must derive relevant principles from
those decisions, thus moving the law toward greater abstraction and cer-
tainty. An alternative model of judicial behavior, however, emphasizes
judicial discretion and flexibility aimed at reaching equitable results in
individual cases.8 9 As we have seen, the Delaware courts have tended
87. One can examine the factors that the court noted in granting the Pilsbury injunction, see
supra note 82, and ask whether a variation in one or more of them would have affected the result. If
the target board had reasonably feared changes in policy, would the court then have permitted a
"just say no" defense? What if only a bare majority of shares, say, 52%, had tendered? What if the
differential between the offer price and the board's restructuring had been higher? What if the
court's estimate of the loss to shareholders had been lower?. The Pillsbury case not only fails to
answer these questions, but, by indicating the relevance of all these factors, it in effect raises such
questions, arguably creating more uncertainty than would a rule that upheld all good faith determi-
nations to "say no."
88. This view of the process of adjudication is probably most closely identified with Ronald
Dworkin. See R. DwoRK;N, LAw's EMPIRE 225-75 (1986).
89. In this regard, it is worth noting that Delaware's trial court for corporate law matters is the
Court of Chancery, in which almost every case involves a motion for injunctive relief. In such cases,
the court can hardly avoid invoking equitable principles. Indeed, the Delaware courts have ex-
pressly referred to equitable principles in defending the lack of a clearer standard in poison pill cases.
In Tate & Lyle PLC v. Staley Continental, Inc., [1987-1988 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep.
(CCH) C 93,764, at 98,584 (Del. Ch. May 9, 1988), Vice-Chancellor Hartnett stated: "The Court of
Chancery has historically been vested with considerable discretion and, although some might desire
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toward this latter approach in ruling on issues of defensive tactics: by
applying only a general standard of proportionality, the courts have left
themselves discretion to decide each individual case on its facts. Under
this model, additional caselaw may actually increase rather than decrease
uncertainty.90
The other argument for certainty and predictability focuses on the
corporate bar itself. Surely corporate lawyers, given their need to advise
clients, have an interest in achieving an understanding of the Delaware
law that will enable them to predict results with relative certainty. Even
if Delaware judges fail to derive general and predictable rules from their
decisions, the corporate bar, through careful attention to the outcomes of
such cases, might succeed in reinterpreting these cases to provide rela-
tively clear and certain "working rules."
This function of the corporate bar is a dynamic force in the develop-
ment of corporate law-a force that does seem to be operating in certain
aspects of poison pill litigation. For example, a growing consensus
among corporate lawyers holds that management, in order to give its
shareholders a fair choice among competing alternatives, may use the
threat of a poison pill to neutralize any timing or other procedural ad-
vantages that a raider may enjoy with respect to subsequently proposed
transactions. 91 Thus, a corporate lawyer advising an incumbent board
would probably tell it that it has no obligation to redeem a pill while
negotiating with a white knight or seeking an alternative, higher offer.
Even this limited "safe harbor" of predictability, however, relies on an
assumption (as yet untested) that if a raider actually sought to consum-
mate an offer prior to the time when management had completed its ne-
gotiations with a white knight, management could validly dilute the
raider by failing to redeem a poison pill. In other words, it is the threat
that management will use the pill in a manner that is of uncertain legality
(to actually dilute a raider) that makes the clearly permissible use (to run
an auction) effective.92
Moreover, while corporate lawyers do tend to seek "safe harbors,"
they also demonstrate a countervailing tendency to create "hard" cases.
In an adversarial takeover situation, an action that constitutes a clearly
permitted use of a pill for management constitutes a serious litigation
problem for a raider. The raider might therefore try to change the situa-
a more definite standard, no hard and fast rule is likely or desirable which will apply to all factual
circumstances."
90. See supra notes 72-74 and accompanying text.
91. See supra note 53.
92. The procedural status of most poison pill cases plays a part in the uncertainty here as well.
For a discussion of this source of uncertainty, see supra notes 75-79 and, accompanying text.
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tion to provoke greater litigation uncertainty. It might, for example, of-
fer to raise its price in exchange for the board's acquiescence in a merger
proposal, thus complicating and unsettling management's claim that it
needs the threat of the pill to buy time.9 3 Such a tactic might force target
management into a straight auction situation, in which it would have to
offer to redeem the pill for the highest bidder. Alternatively, the tactic
might cause the target to reject the offer outright, in which case target
management would have to defend its nonredemption of the pill not as
an attempt to force an auction, but on the much less certain ground that
it wants to keep its company independent.
Another characteristic of corporate lawyers that increases legal un-
certainty is their tendency to take whatever "worked" in a previous deal
and push it a little bit further in the next one. Indeed, one can view the
Interco and Pillsbury cases as attempts to do just that with the rule that
management can use poison pills to run auction contests. In Interco,
management used the pill not just to provide time for an alternative offer,
but to decide the outcome of the contest. 4 In Pillsbury, after manage-
ment had used the threat of the pill for a fairly long time to search out
competing bids, the court said that continued use of the pill for this pur-
pose, in the face of an "adequate" bid, was no longer reasonable in rela-
tion to the threat posed.95 Given that the Delaware courts have held
these uses too extreme and overreaching, we can expect the use of poison
pills in the next auction cases96 to be toned down just enough to create
new "hard cases." 97 In short the corporate bar acts as both a stabilizing
93. Philip Morris seems to have cut short Kraft's efforts to use the pill in order to buy time for
a restructuring by offering an improved bid (although less than the amount Kraft had estimated as
the value available in its restructuring). See Freedman & Gibson, Kraft Accepts Philip Morris's
Sweetened Offer Totaling $3.1 Billion, or $106 a Share in Cash, Wall St. J., Oct. 31, 1986, at A3,
col. 1.
94. See supra note 81.
95. See supra notes 86-87 and accompanying text.
96. Indeed, raiders need not wait until subsequent cases; they can change poison pills in mid-
stream. For example, in Henley Group, Inc. v. Santa Fe S. Pac. Corp., No. 9569, slip op. (Del. Ch.
Mar. 11, 1988) (Westlaw, 1988 WL 23945), a shareholder seeking to wage a proxy contest chal-
lenged the 20% trigger on a flip-in provision as inhibiting his right to join with other shareholders to
form a voting group of over 20%. Id. at 8. Management responded by amending the pill to create a
"proxy carve-out" that would not trigger the pill and that, the court held, removed any threat of
irreparable harm to the plaintiff. Id at 10. Accordingly, the court denied the injunction, while
leaving the pill in place and its overall legality unadjudicated. Idt at 11.
97. If one could organize the terms of various poison pills (and various other defensive tactics)
along a single continuum from "most" to "least" restrictive and rely on courts not to invalidate
tactics that are "less" restrictive than other tactics that have previously been approved, then future
adjudication would reduce predictive uncertainty by producing a clearer understanding of where
"the line" is drawn. The process would be much like trying to guess somebody's age and being told
"higher" or "lower" after each unsuccessful guess. Successive guesses would narrow the range of
possibilities. Many envision legal decisionmaking in exactly this way. See, eg., Dworkin, Law as
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and destabilizing force in poison pill litigation;98 whether its net influence
tends toward greater certainty and predictability of result is far from
clear.
None of these considerations, of course, means that developing clear
and certain rules is impossible.99 What the discussion does show, how-
ever, is that powerful structural forces in this area of the law tend to
perpetuate a substantial degree of uncertainty and therefore prevent such
clear and certain rules from arising.100
Interpretation, 60 TEx. L. REv. 527 (1982). However, one can reasonably question whether the
assumptions necessary to make this model viable actually apply to tender offer litigation (or, for that
matter, to much other litigation).
For example, assume that two poison pill cases, A and B, have been decided, and that case B
involves a more restrictive pill than does case A. A court has invalidated the pill in case B but has
sustained the pill in case A. Based on this precedent, one should be able to accurately predict the
result for any case involving a pill less restrictive than in case A or more restrictive than in R The
only area of uncertainty would be between A and B, and that uncertainty would decrease as the
court decides more cases in that zone. However, if pill A were more restrictive than pill B with
respect to certain factors but less restrictive with respect to others, then the precedents would not
permit accurate prediction, except perhaps for pills identical to A or B (and knowledgeable parties
would certainly do their best to avoid repeating the circumstances ofcaseA or B). Additional cases
under these circumstances might either increase or decrease certainty, since the pills in such cases
would likely resemble valid pills in some respects and invalid pills in other respects.
Finally, neither courts nor lawyers have to account for every prior case. If case A or B is
particularly inconvenient, a court can "limit it to its facts" or otherwise treat it as lacking rule-
determining power. In short, if the law in this area is to become more certain, additional cases alone
will not accomplish that result. Rather, as noted above, greater certainty will result from more
clearly established common understandings among the corporate bar, the courts, and litigants-
understandings that some legal actors will always have an interest in undermining.
98. This analysis suggests that corporate law may actually have an "equilibrium level" of un-
certainty, at which the rules are clear enough to allow corporate lawyers to function effectively as
expert predictors of legal outcomes, but sufficiently unclear to allow them to function effectively as
inventors of new corporate devices and new hard cases. Whether such an equilibrium level exists
and whether some aspects of corporate law have reached such an equilibrium are questions beyond
the scope of this Article.
99. Such rules would most likely develop through the corporate bar's interpretation of an am-
biguous case as a "leading case" containing a useful operational rule. Something like this seems to
be occurring with Smith v. Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d 858 (Del. 1985), a "leading" but fairly ambigu-
ous decision concerning the duty of care. After expressing considerable concern over what new
duties of care, if any, that case imposes on directors considering merger proposals, the corporate bar
seems now to be interpreting the case as merely imposing a formal requirement that boards conduct
their meetings over extended periods of time, provide written information in advance, and conduct
extensive discussion and questioning. Post-Van Gorkom cases indicate judicial acceptance of this
interpretation. See, eg., Cottle v. Storer Communication, Inc., 849 F.2d 570, 575, 578 (11th Cir.
1988) (Van Gorkom duty of care requires use of studies to determine a fair price during merger
deliberations, but does not necessarily require studies from independent sources); In re Anderson,
Clayton Shareholders' Litigation, 519 A.2d 669, 676, 678 (Del. Ch. 1986) (Van Gorkom duty of care
not satisfied when information regarding tender offer not given to shareholders sufficiently in ad-
vance of vote on recapitalization plan that was intended to thwart that offer).
100. One such force, discussed previously, is the procedural posture of most pill cases. See supra
notes 75-79 and accompanying text. The "perfect" case, one in which a board's allegedly wrongful
failure to redeem a pill has actually diluted a raider, is precisely the one least likely to arise. Such a
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III. LEGAL UNCERTAINTY AS A REGULATIVE NORM
Scholars have extensively debated the normative question of which
rules should govern the use of poison pills (and other defensive tech-
niques),1 0° and I do not purport to resolve that question here. Rather,
this part examines thepremises, both normative and factual, that support
various positions concerning the appropriate regulation of poison pill de-
fenses. The part seeks to determine under what premises, if any, a re-
gime of litigation uncertainty is preferable to more clearly defined rules
governing the use of poison pills.
Any normative justification of poison pill regulation must answer
three questions about the ends and means of takeover regulation. First,
whom should the regulation seek to benefit? Second, what substantive
rule would provide that group with the optimal benefit? Third, what
institutional arrangement would in practice most nearly achieve that op-
timal result?
A. The Goals of Takeover Regulation
Regarding the first question, takeover regulation could seek to bene-
fit three distinct groups: the shareholders of companies that are actually
targets of hostile takeovers; the shareholders of all publicly traded com-
panies, that is, companies that are actual or potential targets of hostile
takeovers; and society at large.
The divergence of the first and second groups' interests raises an
interesting policy question: The first group will benefit from any increase
in a tender offer's price (that is, in the premium paid). Accordingly, to
the extent that poison pills and other defensive tactics lead to auction
contests and higher prices for target shareholders, they benefit this first
group. From the perspective of the second group, the shareholders of
potential targets, however, increases in the premiums paid in individual
tender offers might produce a net detriment if those increases lead ulti-
case would involve enormous potential damages and would raise the fiduciary duty issue in a form
that would make it hard for the courts to avoid squarely facing the issue. For a possible (albeit
highly improbable) scenario in which such a case might arise, see supra note 45 and accompanying
text.
101. Some of the most well-known articles are: Bebchuk, The Case for Facilitating Competing
Tender Offers; 95 HARV. L. REv. 1028 (1982); Carney, Shareholder Coordination Costs Shark
Repellents and Takeout Mergers" The Case Against Fiduciary Duties 1983 AM. B. FouND. REs. J.
341; Coffee, Regulating the Market for Corporate ControLk A Critical Assessment of the Tender Offer's
Role in Corporate Governance, 84 COLuM. L. REV. 1145 (1984); Easterbrook & Fischel, The Proper
Role of a Target's Management in Responding to a Tender Offer, 94 HARV. L. REV. 1161 (1981);
Gilson, A Structural Approach to Corporations. The Case Against Defensive Tactics in Tender Offers,
33 STAN. L. REV. 819 (1981); Schwartz, Search Theory and the Tender Offer Auction, 2 J.L. EcoN.
& ORG. 229 (1986).
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mately to a decrease in the total number of takeovers that succeed.10 2
Commentators have generally assumed that maximizing the benefit
to either one of these two groups results in a net gain to society; until
recently, they have paid relatively little attention to the impact of take-
overs on non-shareholder groups such as creditors and employees.' 0 3 In-
deed, the present structure of takeover regulation focuses on the interests
of target shareholders, the group to whom corporate managers owe a
fiduciary duty. If managers' defensive techniques in fact maximize share-
holder returns, then present law is unlikely to condemn such action.
Moreover, poison pill supporters generally defend pills on the ground
that they enable directors to maximize benefits to target shareholders.
The remainder of this discussion, then, will assume, as all of the caselaw
and most of the theoretical discussions do, that takeover regulation exists
to maximize benefit to target shareholders.
Having said that, one confronts the second question: what substan-
tive rule maximizes these benefits? Here again, the literature suggests a
-number of different answers. If one assumes that a stock's pre-takeover
market price best indicates its true value,104 then takeover bids, since
they always involve prices greater than the pre-takeover market prices,
are always value-enhancing.10 5 The optimal rule under these assump-
tions is one that permits the use of a poison pill as a "gavel" to run an
auction and thereby obtain the highest price for shareholders, but never
as a tactic to defeat an offer and permit a target company to stay
102. The debate on this issue has tended to focus on whether white knights and auction contests
increase the costs incurred by those who first seek out takeover targets, thus decreasing their incen-
tives to seek out and make initial tender offer bids. See Bebchuk, supra note 101, at 1034-38; Easter-
brook & Fischel, supra note 101, at 1174-82, Gilson, supra note 101, at 824-31; Schwartz, supra note
101, at 242-44.
103. Coffee, Shareholders Versus Managers The Strain in the Corporate Web, 85 MIcH. L. REv.
1, 73-74 (1986) (m the past, shareholders have been seen as sole riskbearers and thus sole benefi-
ciaries of directors' fiduciary obligations, Johnson, Corporate Takeovers and Corporations: Who Are
They For?, 43 WAsH. & LEE L. REv. 781, 784-87 (1986) (m the past, commentators have assumed
that interests of shareholders and other societal groups coincide or that to extent that they diverge,
public policy, not private management, should provide remedy); Macey, Externalities, Firm-Specific
Capital Investments, and the Legal Treatment of Fundamental Corporate Changes, 1989 DuKE LJ.
173,173-74 (only recently have commentators begun to recognize the right of external actors, as well
as shareholders and directors, to share in decisionmaking regarding corporate changes).
104. For a summary of the efficient-market hypothesis and analysis of its potential limitations,
see Gilson & Kraakman, The Mechanisms of Market Efficiency. 70 VA. L. Rnv. 549, 565-92 (1984);
Wang, SomeArguments That the Stock Market Is Not Efficient, 19 U.C. DAvis L. REv. 341, 344-77
(1986).
105. The sole exception would be an extremely coercive two-tier bid, with a second step way
below market- In the current takeover market, however, it is hard to imagine such an offer ever
being made, let alone succeeding.
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independent. 1o6
Rather than relying on the valuation contained in the market price,
however, one might assume, as the distorted-choice models presented in
part I do,107 that shareholders' subjective valuations of their stock may
differ substantially from market price, and may be better indicators of
value (or normatively preferable determinants of a takeover bid's suc-
cess). 10 8 Under that assumption, the goal of takeover regulation would
be to prevent the consummation of offers at prices below shareholders'
subjective valuation of their shares. As we have seen, such undervalued
offers may succeed if they take the form of "coercive" two-tier or partial
offers under which target shareholders, to avoid a lower second-step offer
or a minority position in a company controlled by the offeror, will tender
their shares even if the tender price falls below their subjective valuation
of their stock.
Courts or legislatures could give effect to the distorted-choice
model's assumptions in tender offer regulation by simply prohibiting all
two-tier and partial offers."° 9 A blanket prohibition would force offerors
to make "any and all" offers, which promise all shareholders the same
aggregate value and allow shareholders to evaluate that figure without
coercion. 110 Offers that promise more than the subjective valuations of a
sufficient number of shareholders would succeed, those that promise less
106. The first part of this rule seems to be becoming the law in Delaware. Revlon, Inc. v.
MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings, Inc., 506 A.2d 173 (Del. 1986), apparently gives incumbent man-
agement that has decided to endorse the sale of a company an affirmative duty to maintain an auc-
tion in which the highest bid will suicceed. The use of a poison pill as a "gavel" in such an auction
was expressly approved in CRTC Corp. v. Federated Dep't Stores, Inc., 683 F. Supp. 422, 439
(S.D.N.Y. 1988), and Facet Enters. v. Prospect Group, Inc., No. 9746, slip op. at 6 (Del. Ch. Apr.
15, 1988) (Westlaw, 1988 WL 46064).
The second part of the rule, however, is not the law. As the previous part demonstrates, see
supra notes 88-100 and accompanying text, it remains extremely unclear whether and when incum-
bent management may use a pill to keep a company independent (indeed, the effective use of the pill
as a gavel for such an auction may well require such uncertainty).
107. See supra notes 29-40 and accompanying text.
108. One might believe that shareholders' subjective valuations of their stock are less reliable
than market price, but that respect for private property normatively justifies a legal rule that protects
shareholders from being coerced into giving up their property at a price that they subjectively think
inadequate. But see Bebchuk, supra note 29, at 1764 & n.154 (refusing to embrace such an ap-
proach, and arguing instead that "[t]he undistorted choice objective is desirable for reasons of eco-
nomic efficiency").
109. Note that even if we take account of the distorting effect of changes in the time value of
money, see supra note 30, and drop the simplifying assumption of equal valuation by shareholders,
see Bebchuk, supra note 29, at 1740-41; supra text following note 30, we can justify a blanket prohi-
bition on partial and two-tier offers as a clear and certain rule that would eliminate the most coercive
transactions.
110. The justification for a blanket prohibition on two-tier and partial offers rests on the assump-
tion that no adequate offers will be deterred or diminished in value, since any such offer can be made
as an "any and all" offer with the same consideration offered in the second step. If, however, some
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would fail, and defensive tactics, including poison pills, would have no
role except possibly to buy some time for an auction.
Thus, neither a market model nor a shareholder-choice model pro-
vides much justification for the use of poison pills, except in certain lim-
ited circumstances. This conclusion makes sense, since those models
view either the market price or shareholders' valuations as the best deter-
minants of an offer's adequacy. Poison pills, in contrast, take the ulti-
mate decision about the adequacy of a tender offer away from market
forces or the shareholder group, and give that decision to target manage-
ment.111 Accordingly, to justify the continued use of poison pills in
tender offer contests, one must argue that, at least in some identifiable
class of cases, incumbent management can better judge the adequacy of
an offer than either the market or shareholders can.
Some have indeed argued that the market, and shareholders as a
group, systematically "undervalue" the stock of certain companies. Tar-
get shareholders and the market are alleged to "discount" some corpora-
tions' assets below their true and realizable value, either because
shareholders wrongly distrust management's plans to realize that value
or because the market simply fails, for extended periods, to value certain
types of corporate assets accurately. This view, long espoused by defend-
ers of corporate management, who speak of the need for long-term in-
vestment strategies and the inappropriateness of pressuring managers to
generate short-term profits, has been gaining increasing academic
support.112
If one accepts the assumptions of this model, then at least in theory
there are some offers that, while above current market price and share-
holder valuations, are nonetheless inadequate in that they fall below the
true and obtainable value of the corporation's assets. This model, unlike
the other two, implies that management may appropriately use defensive
tactics, including poison pills, not simply to buy time for higher bids, but
also to prevent consummation of bids that seek to purchase undervalued
corporate assets at a price below their true value. Of course, it may be
impossible to develop an effective method for identifying such inadequate
offers, but that raises a question of means, not ends. 113
significant number of potentially adequate but coercively structured offers could not be restructured
in this way, then something other than a blanket prohibition would be the optimal rule.
11. See supra note 28 and accompanying text.
112. See, ag., Kraakman, Taking Discounis Seriously: The Implications of "Discounted" Share
Prices as an Acquisition Motive, 88 COLUM. L. REv. 891, 897-901 (1988) (attributing asset discounts
to fear of future misinvestment by corporate managers and "mispricing" by uninformed traders).
113. Before we deal with the question of means, however, we should consider the extent to
which empirical evidence can shed light on these policy issues. The primary empirical evidence on
the effect of poison pills appears in a 1986 study by the Chief Economist of the SEC, which analyzes
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B. , The Means of Poison Pill Regulation
The assumption that market price provides the best indicator of
value implies, as the rule for maximizing shareholder welfare, that man-
how the adoption of poison pills affected 245 corporations that adopted poison pills between June
1983 and July 1986. OFFICE OF THE CHIEF ECONOMIST, SEC, supra note 5, at 7, 22-23. The study
makes two significant findings. Fst, it concludes that although for the sample as a whole the adop-
tion of poison pills had no statistically significant immediate effect on stock prices, when the study
limited the total sample of companies to those about which there was "takeover speculation" prior to
the announcement of the adoption of a pill, the adoption of a pill led to a statistically significant
diminution in average stock price of 1.7%. Id at 42. Adoption of pills defined in the study as
"discriminatory," primarily flip-in and back-end pills, had a more deleterious effect on stock prices,
2.2%, in situations involving takeover speculation. /d
Second, the study found that of the 30 companies with pills that became subjects of control
contests, 16 companies were acquired and 14 remained independenL Of the 16 acquired companies,
13 were acquired after auction contests which resulted in an average premium gain of 14%. The
other three were acquired through creeping tender offers. In the six months following the defeat of
the offers for the stock of the other 14 companies, the adjusted average price of these companies'
stock declined 17%. Id at 41 & tbls. 2-4. This figure led the study to conclude that "[t]hese empiri-
cal tests, taken together, show that poison pills are harmful to target shareholders, on net." IR at
43.
The study provides important data on the effectiveness and utilization of poison pills during the
relevant period. It shows that pills can indeed be show-stoppers, and were in about 46% of the
cases. This level of failure of offers may seem high, particularly given the pressure toward settlement
described in this Article. Yet if one compares it with Comment & Jarrell's study of offers between
1981 and 1984, Comment & Jarrell, supra note 13, at 296, which found that 24% of initial non-
negotiated offers were unsuccessful, then the use of poison pills may account for a 22% increase in
the rate of failure of hostile offers. Although Comment and Jarrell's study covers the period when
the pill was first introduced, the success rates it reports for 1981 and 1982, when the pill was clearly
not a factor, are consistent with the overall failure rate of about 25% for non-negotiated initial bids.
The fact that the introduction 6f poison pills may have caused the failure rate for hostile bids to
rise from 24% to 46% does not refute the assertion that pills are not insurmountable obstacles.
Even the SEC's data show hostile offers succeeding more often than failing. Moreover, while most
"successful" takeovers undoubtedly involved negotiated settlements, some of the "unsuccessful"
ones probably ended through negotiated buy-backs or other forms of "greenmail." This, too, com-
ports with the model described above.
Finally, the time period of the SEC study, from mid-1983 to mid-1986, represents an early stage
in the use of the poison pill, a time when the pill was perhaps viewed as a more formidable obstacle;
the study may thus no longer reflect the impact of pills on the present takeover market. As the study
also shows, incumbent management used the pill more often against "any and all" offers than against
two-tier or partial bids. OFFICE OF THE CHIEF ECONOMIST, SEC, supra note 5, at 41-42. This
statistic merely reflects that most of the offers studied were "any and all" offers. In order to reach its
normative conclusions, however, the study must presuppose the answers to some of the questions
discussed above.
The SEC study's methodology assumes that defensive maneuvers exist to benefit target share-
holders. The study reaches its normative conclusion by weighing the benefits and detriments of
poison pills from the target shareholder perspective. The study's methodology also presupposes that
the appropriate measure of that benefit or detriment is the rise or decline of the market price of
target stock in the wake of the adoption of a pill. Similarly, it assumes that market prices represent
the best indicator of the actual value of corporate shares. As we have seen, however, those who
argue for a greater management role in the use of poison pills challenge precisely that assumption.
From this critical perspective, the study's results remain consistent with the view that the market
generally undervalues some corporate shares. If the 14 companies that used the pill to defeat offers
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agers should use pills only to foster auction contests, that is, to buy
enough time to seek out the best offers available. Under such a rule,
uncertainty may still play a useful role in regard to the timing of such
contests. The use of pills has already made the Williams Act's twenty-
business-day rule largely irrelevant to the determination of when a tender
offer may be consummated. 1 4 That decision now often lies in the hands
of a Delaware judge, who can either end the waiting period by granting
an injunction against a poison pin or extend the period by refusing to
grant such an injunction. The argument for uncertainty and flexibility
here is that giving management a flexible time period for developing com-
peting offers, a period that can only be "closed" by a successful motion to
force redemption of a pill, would permit individualized consideration of
each auction process and would keep appropriate pressure on manage-
ment to act expeditiously.
Moreover, where timing is in dispute, motion practice before a judge
may prove more effective than other means of resolving the issue. The
were those whose shares the market "undervalued," then the fact that these companies' average
share price subsequently went down simply provides further proof of their "undervaluation." The
study's own model can explain the drop in average price from the pre-tender-offer level as simply a
drop in the perceived probability of a successful takeover. See id at 17. Moreover, one need not
accept the assumption that all 14 of the defeated offers just happened to be the "undervalued" ones.
One need only assume that the group of defeated offers contained some undervalued offers, and the
net benefit or detriment of poison pills to target shareholders becomes far less clear. Of course, even
"undervalued" stock, if the term is to have any meaning, must have added value that can be realized
at some point. Those who maintain that the market systematically undervalues some stocks would
maintain, however, that a six-month time horizon is far too short for evidence of that added value to
emerge- Such revaluation, in their view, would likely result from some subsequent triggering event,
like a restructuring or another takeover attempt. See, e.&, Gilson & Kraakman, supra note 19.
Moreover, the SEC study does not even purport to answer the question of the optimum rule to
govern management's use of poison pills, but only the far narrower question of whether poison pills,
as actually utilized between 1983 and 1986, were a net benefit or detriment to target shareholders.
The study implies, however, that target shareholders in the years studied would have been better off
under a rule prohibiting the use of poison pills than under the rules that courts were actually apply-
ing. See Ommcn OF THE CtiEF ECONOMIST, SEC supra note 5, at 43. The study also implies that
other rules, such as a rule permitting management to use pills to foster auctions, but not to remain
independent, would yield results superior to those to be expected from a blanket prohibition of pills.
Under the study's methodology, such a rule would have resulted in a net gain of 14%, while a
straight prohibition would only have increased shareholder benefits by 2%. Id at 27-28. In the end,
the study provides no answer to the normative question of which rule on the use of poison pills
maximizes shareholder welfare.
Another significant limitation on the usefulness of the study is that the use of poison pills, along
with strategies to defeat them, may have changed significantly since the time of the SEC study. For
example, three of the control contests studied ended in a "creeping" tender offer, presumably against
a flip-over pill that provided no protection against such tactics. Now that pills combining flip-ins
and flip-overs have become popular, one wonders whether those three acquisitions, if made today,
would be made as tender offers that would lead to auctions and additional premiums, perhaps suffi-
ciently high premiums to add three points to the average and "tip" the net balance.
114. See supra notes 52-54 and accompanying text.
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public nature of judicial proceedings ensures that all interested parties
will receive adequate notice of when an auction period will close. Also,
in view of the strategic behavior common to negotiated auctions, a neu-
tral judge, questioning from the bench, might be in a better position to
ascertain the status of negotiations and parties' true positions than any of
the participants. Finally, the question whether to give managers more
time to negotiate or to push them toward deciding on an offer is not
dissimilar to other questions that courts frequently answer; it thus seems
well suited to judges' experience in sizing up and resolving concrete dis-
putes. Once bidding has stopped, however, the market model of valua-
tion implies that litigation over pills no longer has any useful role to play.
If uncoerced shareholder choice ought to determine a tender offer's
success, then a blanket prohibition of coercive bids would seem to be the
optimal rule. Even in the absence of such a general prohibition, allowing
poison pills to be used against (and only against) all coercive offers might
achieve the same result. Such a rule would involve little uncertainty and
would be relatively easy for courts to apply.
Finding the optimal rule becomes somewhat more complicated,
however, if one accepts the premise that at least some takeover bids tar-
get stock that the market undervalues. In such cases, directors might
maximize values to target shareholders by using poison pills to resist
such bids. One can still state, as a purely theoretical matter, that the
appropriate rule should permit the use of pills against bids for "underval-
ued" shares, and no others. The problem, of course, is that there is no
operational rule for distinguishing bids for undervalued shares from of-
fers to pay a premium for appropriately valued shares. Nor is it possible
to tell when a bid is sufficiently high that it no longer represents an at-
tempt to profit from discounted share value, but rather offers more than
the share value that incumbent management will likely realize in the long
term.
Moreover, as a practical matter, who could completely make such a
determination, and what criteria could they apply? By definition, the
market price is not a valid measure of undervalued shares' value; nor are
the shareholders' subjective valuations since their refusal to pay a price
representing the true value of the shares has led to the undervaluation.
That leaves only two possible arbiters of an offer's adequacy: the courts
and target management. Establishing either of these as a decisionmaker
clearly presents difficulties. Judges, while presumably impartial, proba-
bly cannot evaluate the adequacy of a tender offer price against a com-
pany's future prospects more effectively than shareholders or the market.
Target managers, in contrast, may well have unique insights and exper-
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tise into a company's future prospects, but are likely to be far from
impartiaL
Given these problems, those who believe in the existence of market
undervaluation have three possible options in prescribing practical rules
to govern tender offers. The first is to acknowledge undervaluation in
theory but to ignore it as a practical matter. If the dangers of judicial
mistake and management bias are so great either group's evaluations of
tender offer prices are likely to yield a greater number of erroneous deci-
sions (Le., more adequate offers deterred and undervalued ones permit-
ted) than would a straightforward auction or shareholder-choice rule
(which, under the assumptions of this model, will inevitably permit some
undervalued offers to succeed), then an auction or shareholder-choice
rule is still the optimal practical rule.
The second alternative is to try to reduce the likelihood of judicial
mistake by creating a legal rule1 5 that courts can apply fairly predictably
and that will enable courts to distinguish adequate tender offers from
inadequate ones.116 This approach would be optimal only if it would in
fact result in fewer mistakes (as defined above) than other potential
modes of enforcement would.117
The third alternative is to try to reduce the effects of target manage-
ment's partiality by putting such managers in a situation that creates
powerful incentives for accurately assessing their company's future pros-
pects when they decide whether a pending offer is adequate. As part I
demonstrates, 18 target management defending a suit that seeks redemp-
tion of a poison pill faces potential damages that far exceed the value to
management of a successful tender offer defense. In deciding whether to
redeem the pill, seek a higher offer, or try to remain independent, target
management thus has a strong incentive to accurately assess its com-
pany's future prospects.
A regime of legal uncertainty forces incumbent management to con-
stantly weigh its own desire to remain in control against a downside risk
of massive liability for breach of fiduciary duty. Although it cannot eas-
ily predict the results of such a lawsuit, management knows that it can
substantially iml~rove its chances of success if the value it can subse-
quently realize for shareholders exceeds the value of the offer it is seeking
115. See supra note 67.
116. Gilson and Kraakman undertake essentially that project in their recent article. Gilson &
Kraakman, supra note 19, at 266-71 (creating "an effective proportionality test").
117. In the case of Gilson and Kraakman's proposal, the rule relies on independent directors and
their advisors exercising at least a modicum of good faith as they make "plans" for realizing those
hidden values, as well as some judicial ability to evaluate such plans. Id at 271-73.
118. See supra notes 41-46 and accompanying text.
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to defeat. On the other hand, if management defeats the offer and stock
prices fall and remain low, both the likelihood that stockholders will
bring fiduciary duty suits and the likelihood that management will lose
those suits increase. Such considerations are likely to counteract man-
agement's normal enthusiasm and optimism about its own plans for en-
hancing the company's prospects. Unless management feels relatively
certain that it can unlock sources of value that the market has not seen, it
may feel a strong incentive to accept the highest offer tendered.
Uncertainty and lack of definitive judicial guidance concerning pill
redemption also encourage raiders to increase their offers, even in the
absence of a competitive bid. A raider has relatively little incentive to
raise its offer once it has either won or lost in poison pill litigation. 119 If,
however, the raider knows that it faces an incumbent board that is uncer-
tain about whether it can legally refuse to redeem the pill, each dollar of
added value increases the pressure on that board. This possibility gives
raiders an incentive to offer a higher price, even to the most self-inter-
ested and entrenchment-oriented target boards. Such an incentive also
has some tendency to alleviate the problem of undervalued bids.
Accordingly, in a regime of legal uncertainty, even an utterly self-
concerned management group must try to make the most accurate possi-
ble comparison between the value offered by a raider and the value that
management believes it can obtain in the future. Precisely such a com-
parison determines whether an offer is adequate or not, and incumbent
managers, who might well be in the best position to do so, make this
comparison under circumstances in which their own self-interest requires
extreme care.120
For this model to work, the threat of subsequent litigation must be
real but not overwhelming. Too great a fear of liability would induce
management to accept inadequate offers. Too great an insulation from
liability would destroy the incentive effect altogether. 121 It is not neces-
119. If it has won, the pil no longer poses a threat. If it has lost, however, it may rationally
believe that only a very large increase in the premium offered would induce fully protected manage-
ment to give up its position of control.
120. 1 do not mean to imply that incumbent managers make this decision alone. Presumably,
they make these determinations on the basis of advice from their lawyers about the nature and
degree of potential litigation threats, and advice from their financial advisors about the value that the
company can realize.
121. Some may argue that the ubiquity of directors' and officers' insurance and statutes like
DEL. CODE AUNi. tit. 8, § 145 (1983 & Supp. 1988) (if party acted in good faith, in manner she
reasonably believed did not oppose best interests of corporation, and had no reasonable cause to
believe conduct was unlawful, she can be indemnified even if convicted or judgment was entered
against her), give officers and directors so much protection from personal liability in such suits that
the incentive to evaluate offers carefully is weak or nonexistent. The issue, however, is not how
likely directors are to be held personally liable, but how likely they are to be concerned about the
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sary, however, that a great deal of such litigation occur 122 or that case
outcomes be clear and predictable. It is enough if a few polar cases es-
tablish that management has little to worry about if it subsequently real-
izes more value for its shareholders than a raider has offered, but that
management runs a more serious risk if it does not realize such value. 123
CONCLUSION
This Article has considered the uncertainty surrounding poison pill
litigation not as a problem to be solved, but as a phenomenon to be ex-
plained. It has attempted to show that uncertain legal standards might,
under some circumstances, function well as or even better than the most
clear and predictable ones. This seems particularly true in the area of
poison pill litigation, where courts have proven unwilling to enunciate
rules that will determine the results of takeover contests, yet hold a
strong conviction that the actions of the participants require careful judi-
cial surveillance. The Article has suggested why such a judicial attitude
may be valid and justifiable, and why a regime of continuing legal uncer-
tainty may be the most desirable means of poison pim regulation.
possibility. Modern life is filled with instances of individuals giving undue concern to certain types
of dangers (e.g., muggings) that are statistically far less probable than other dangers-for which they
show less concern (e.g., car accidents). The outcry over Van Gorkom and the powerful pressures for
giving managers additional protection indicate that substantial concern with these matters remains.
In the poison pill area, where a raider can easily allege "willful" wrongdoing and alleged damages
can easily exceed the amount of any insurance coverage, these concerns are probably even greater.
122. As Professor Cox has pointed out, a derivative suit remedy whose primary function is deter-
rence rather than compensation may have the desired effect at a much lower level of private enforce-
ment activity. Cox, Compensation, Deterrence and the Market as Boundaries for Derivative Suit
Procedure; 52 GEo. WAsH. L. Rav. 745, 775-76 (1984).
123. Such a result is likely to follow from the very nature of the injury claimed. If shareholders
who miss out on a deal because of management's failure to redeem a poison pill subsequently obtain
equal or greater value for their shares, it is hard to see what damages they could receive. See, eg.,
Terrydale Liquidating Trust v. Bamess, 642 F. Supp. 917, 928 (S.D.N.Y. 1986) (no breach of fiduci-
ary duty when subsequent sale of assets provided more value than defeated tender offer), aff'd, 846
F.2d 845 (2d Cir. 1988).
